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ABSTRACT
The robotics industry has received tremendous attention
in the popular press, as well as in the academic and
financial communities. Robot technology is looked upon
as a key to restoring the U.S.'s industrial preeminence.
This thesis examines the evolution of this important
industry, paying particular attention to the factors that
have caused it to evolve as it has, and to what we might
expect the industry's future to be. The first two sections
discuss robot technology and applications. The balance
of the thesis is devoted to documenting and analyzing the
history of the industry, with an emphasis on strategic and
structural issues.
Robots are systems comprised of many distinct component
technologies. Some of these are more dynamic than others,
thus having an effect on a firm's ability to stake out
a position based on existing technological expertise.
Computer technology, especially control and sensor
processing software, is expected to have the greatest
impact on the industry. The technological diversity has
created opportunities for a broad range of firms, and has
been an incentive to form interfirm relationships. The
high applications engineering content of robot systems has
forced robot suppliers to provide a high degree of customer
support, and has made niching by application an effective
strategy. The early international diffusion of robot
technology has had important effects on the U.S. robot
industry. Japanese and European firms now present a
substantial competitive threat to U.S. firms, as well as
providing a source of partners for U.S. firms seeking to
enter the industry by licensing proven robot technology.
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Furthermore, the early Japanese adoption of robots
contributed to their achieving a position of worldwide
manufacturing superiority. This has in turn stimulated
the demand for robots in the U.S. and Europe, as firms
are trying to regain their competitiveness.
Because of the competitive pressures in the robot
industry, and the ability of firms to carve out niches,
it is expected that the industry will become less concentrated.
As end users become more sophisticated, it is likely that
they will demand that robots be available on a modular,
component basis. Thus, robot components will "commodities"-
with the resulting implications for competitive strategies
and industry profitability.
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Zenon Zannetos
Title: Professor of Management
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1. Introduction
The evolution of industry is one of the purest of Darwinian
processes. Through a combination of luck, strategy and
execution, firms within an industry prosper, fail or mutate in
order to survive. Since firms in part base their strategies on
expectations of industry growth and evolution, it would be
useful to understand the implications of the various stages of
industry evolution on a firm's strategic choices. This thesis
examines a particularly dynamic and newsworthy industry -
robotics - in an attempt to understand the strategic behavior
of firms as a function of industry evolution.
The robotics industry has received a tremendous amount of
attention in academia, the financial world and in the popular
press. Industrial automation is looked upon as one of the keys
to restoring this country's industrial pre-eminence. The
potential economic and social impacts alone justify the study
of this industry. In addition, there are a number of
underlying characteristics and empirical phenomena that make
the robotics industry interesting from a strategic standpoint.
It is driven by a diverse array of technologies - mechanical
design, artificial intelligence, materials science,
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to name just a few. Robotics is also a subset of a broader
technology popularly called 'factory of the future' - the large
scale automation and networking of factory equipment. This
diversity of technology creates opportunities for many firms.
Indeed, the industry has attracted a large number of entrants
from many different technology tracks. These firms range from
thinly funded startups to some of the largest companies in the
world, including IBM and General Motors. But which of these
firms will succeed, and what are the appropriate strategic
responses to the technological diversity? One of the more
interesting responses has been the plethora of joint ventures
and licensing agreements in the last few years. Another unique
response has been the unprecedented industry commitment to
funding academic research in robotics. Understanding the role
of technology and technological diversity can help not only
company strategists, but also public policy makers concerned
with technology based industry.
Another interesting and important phenomenon is the strong
international flavor in the industry. Although robots were
'invented" in the United States, Japan has taken the lead in
implementing robot technology. In the last five years,
American companies looking to enter the burgeoning robot market
have gone to Japan and Western Europe to license proven robot
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technology. This importing of robot technology is yet another
violation of the conventional "international product life
cycle" model in which technology is first developed in the
United States, then exported to the rest of the world. And
what is especially ironic about the robot industry is that
given our high labor costs, a productivity improving innovation
such as robots should have caught on here before in countries
with lower relative labor costs. What was it that caused Japan
to adopt robotic technology so quickly? And given the head
start that Japan and some European countries have in robotizing
their factories, how can United States companies compete in
this truly international market? These questions are also
important to both corporate strategists and public policy
makers.
The purpose of this thesis can be thought of as answering the
following three questions about the robot industry:
1. Why did robot technology give rise to a distinct
industry?
2. What factors have caused it to evolve the way it has?
3. What might we expect to happen in the industry in the
future?
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I will address these general questions by documenting and
analyzing the historical evolution of the industry, from its
inception in the late 1950's to the present. Particular
attention will be paid to understanding individual firms'
motivations and strategies for entry into the industry as well
as their competitive marketing and technological strategies,
and how these factors have changed over time. The interesting
empirical aspects of the industry mentioned previously will
fall out as the results of underlying economic and
technological forces.
In order to lay a framework for understanding individual firms'
strategies, the first two sections will discuss robot
technology and applications. The next section will then
discuss the evolution of the robot industry, both descriptively
and analytically. In the concluding section, I will answer the
three basic questions spelled out above, and attempt to
generalize from the experience of the robot industry.
2. Robotic Technology
This Section will outline the diverse technologies that are
embodied in what is popularly called robotics". A premise of
this thesis is that the industry is interesting to study
because of this diversity of technologies. The diversity
creates opportunities for firms in a wide variety of
industries, ranging from those who develop component
technologies to those who function as system integrators.
It will become clear in this Section that the technologies with
the greatest potential impact on the industry are those based
on computer hardware and software. The mechanical technology
embodied in the robot is quite mature, and unlikely to change
dramatically or to stimulate growth or change in the industry.
Such generalizations about technological change and its impact
on the industry will help us understand and evaluate the
strategic choices of robot manufacturers.
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2.1 Classification and Definition
Robots are systems of widely varying complexity, intelligence
and cost. The different types of robots generally do not
compete for given applications and certainly all robot
manufacturers do not compete with each other. Robots are
generally categorized by control strategy, for it is the degree
of control and intelligence that determines the suitability of
a robot for a particular application. A simple schema for
categorizing robots by control and relative technological
maturity is:
(1) non servo, point to point robots - the simplest robots
usually used to simply pick up and move an object. Most
technologically mature. (30-35% of United States robot base)
[20],
(2) servo controlled, continuous path robots - more complex
robots that can be used for assembly, painting and welding as
well as materials transfer (65-70% of United States robot
base), [20] and
(3) sensor based, highly intelligent robots - the most complex
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robots - they can interact with their environment and are
generally used for assembly and complicated processing. State
of the art technology. (less than 5% of existing United
States robot base) [20].
This chema will be more fully explained in the discussion of
control technology, and will later be used in analyzing the
structure of the robotics industry.
There has been some controversy due to the various definitions
of robots, especially with respect to the broad Japanese
definition. A comparison of the official" definitions of the
Japanese Industrial Robot Association (JIRA) and the Robot
Institute of America (R.I.A.) appears in Figure 1. For the
purposes of this study, the more restrictive R.I.A. definition
is appropriate. Included in the Japanese definition are
devices better described as "hard-automation" or
"tele-operators", rather than as industrial robots.
2.2 Component Technologies
The next few sections will outline robotic technology by
looking at the important components in a robot system. These
components are:
1. manipulator or arm
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2. activator or power source
3. end effector or tool
4. sensors
5. controller - hardware and software.
In addition, other important technologies including parts
fixturing, local area networking and the concept of Factory of
the Future' will be discussed.
2.3 Manipulators
The manipulator is the mechanical arm' of the robot and, as
previously mentioned, the most mature and well developed of all
the components. The arm is basically a system of linkages and
joints that can accomplish motion with varying degrees of
freedom, or axes of movement. Manipulators are generally
categorized by basic architecture and further classified by the
number of degrees of freedom. Typically, three degrees of
freedom are provided by the arm itself and from 1-3 are
provided by the wrist.' The four basic manipulator
architectures are: (see Figure 2)
1. anthropomorphic - articulated or jointed arms resembling
human arms
15
EXISTING ROBOTIC MANIPULATOR TYPES
ANTHROPOMORPHIC
CARTESIAN CYLINDRICAL
FIGURE 2
Source: Yankee Group,
1981
POLAR
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2. cylindrical - arms mounted and travelling around a central
axis
3. polar - arms mounted on a central axis but also having a
tilting capability
4. cartesian - arms that move along three perpendicular tracks.
Anthropomorphic arms have the advantage of the greatest working
volume for a given robot size. They are generally the most
complex and fragile of the four architectures and are used in
applications involving light payloads, such as light assembly
or spray painting and arc welding.
Cylindrical arms have been used primarily in machine tool
loading and unloading applications, but their inability to tilt
severely constrains their usefulness. It is one of the
earliest (and simplest) of arm designs and is gradually being
displaced by the more versatile but similar polar arms.
The polar arm is quite similar to the cylindrical arm, except
that it has the extra degree of freedom that allows it to
tilt. The polar arm can be though of as the "original" arm
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design but it is far from obsolescent. Its usefulness in spot
welding applications in the automobile industry in part drove
the robot "explosion" of the 1970's. In addition, it is used
in many materials transer operations.
The cartesian arm is the least anthropomorphic of all the robot
architectures. Its motion is determined by combinations of
linear movement in three dimensions, so computationally it is
the simplest to control. As a result, cartesian robots are
very accurate and are finding use in high precision electronic
assembly applications. In addition, most of the simple pick
and place manipulators are cartesian devices.
Although arm technology is well developed and relatively
mature, incremental improvements in speed, precision and
accuracy will be achieved. However, most of these improvements
will be realized through software or controller improvements
rather than through changes in mechanical design nature.
Perhaps the most important changes in arm design will be in the
use of lighter materials such as graphite composites which will
allow for much lighter and, therefore, faster and easier to
control robots.
An interesting and slightly controversial design issue is the
relative importance of anthropomorphic features in robot
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arm design. In his forecast of robot technology, Albus of the
National Bureau of Standards predicts that the " ...
utilization of biomechanical concepts will result in superior
robot structures"[20]. But do we want to use the human arm as
a model for robot arms? Professor Warren Seering, M.I.T.,
states " ... Any attempt to emulate human behavior with a robot
is a mis-direction ... It is predicated on the idea that
humans, particularly human arms, are optimally designed to do
factory work. And this is not true ... The primary advantage
that robots will have ... will be based not on their ability to
mimic humans but on their abilities to perform tasks in ways
which humans cannot."[47]. This is an important issue that has
bearing on the direction of robotic research in general. It
has implications for robot manufacturers as well. Should
product development be directed towards highly intelligent,
general purpose robots that can emulate human behavior and
motions, or towards simpler systems that utilize manipulators
designed to perform specific tasks? This important distinction
between highly intelligent, general purpose robots and simpler
but more specialized robots raises strategic questions as well
as technical ones. These questions will be discussed in
Section 4.
2.4 End Effectors
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The end effector is the robot's "hand" - the device that
contacts the work piece or the tool that processes it. These
devices can range from grippers" which open and close, to
spray painting guns or welding torches. The latter are simply
conventional tools that have been adapted for robotic arms
rather than human arms. The grippers and other tools that are
used to handle or process an object are usually unique to a
particular application and are often designed by the end user.
They use mechanical magnetic and suction techniques to
manipulate the work piece. A great deal of effort is directed
towards developing general purpose grippers. These grippers
will have integral force, tactile, proximity and even vision
sensors that will allow the gripper to be adaptable for use
with a variety of part configurations. It appears that the
trend in gripper development is also along anthropomorphic
lines. The strategic and technological choice is, again,
whether to develop flexible, general purpose end effectors or
specialized, custom ones. Clearly, the more interesting (and
potentially profitable) development problem is the universal,
general purpose gripper. However, the more practical and
expedient approach is the use of specialized end effectors.
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2.5 Actuators
The actuating system provides the robot arm with motive power.
These systems are generally pneumatic, electric or hydraulic.
The choice of which system to use in a given robot application
depends on requirements for strength, speed and cost. Certain
applications use combinations of drive technologies. These
technologies are rather mature, having been developed for use
in aerospace and industrial control applications.
Pneumatic systems are the simplest, fastest and most
inexpensive of the drive systems. However, they cannot provide
much strength and are not well suited to continuous path
control. Thus, pneumatic drives are usually used in simple
pick and place applications with light payloads.
Hydraulic drives are much more powerful than pneumatics and can
be more closely controlled. These drives make use of
compressed hydraulic fluids and thus require auxiliary pumps
and storage tanks. They have been criticized for leaking and
causing a great deal of machine downtime. However, they are
quite versatile, well understood and relatively inexpensive.
It is the most widely used robot drive system, especially for
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larger robots.
There are a range of different types of electric drives ranging
from simple, inexpensive stepper motors to high power DC servo
drives. ("servo" simply implies that the motor is part of a
closed loop feedback control system; most electric and
hydraulic drives are "servo controlled") Electric drives are
usually used in applications having very large payloads. In
addition, the development of relatively low cost AC servo
motors is leading to the gradual displacement of hydraulic
systems in smaller robots, especially those used in high
precision assembly applications. Electric motors have the
distinct advantage over hydraulic drives of not using a
potentially leaky and troublesome working fluid, and of being
more energy efficient. However, electric drives are generally
more expensive than hydraulic drives.
Robot manufacturers generally do not manufacture their own
actuator systems, rather, they are built up using standard
electric, hydraulic or pneumatic components purchased from a
drive or controls supplier and adapted for use in robot
systems. Research and development work is aimed at improving
the reliability and strength/weight ratios of drive systems,
with most of the effort focused on electric drives.
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2.6 Sensors
Sensors allow the robot to interact with its environment - to
touch, feel and see the work piece. Very few robots today make
use of sophisticated sensors. The most commonly used sensors
are electro-optical parts presence sensors which tell the robot
if the work piece has been grasped or if it is properly
oriented. Electro-optics is a basic industrial control
technology that has been applied to robotics. However, the
development of tactile' or touch sensors, vision systems and
force feedback are very much driven by robotics applications,
and may be considered to be seminal robotic technologies. It
is important to note that the application of sophisticated
sensing devices is not strictly a hardware problem, but is also
a difficult software and control problem.
Force feedback is accomplished using existing strain measuring
devices adapted for robotic systems, as well as making use of
internal measurements of hydraulic pressure or back electro
motive force (emf) in the robots drive system. The problem is
not so much in measuring forces, but in knowing what to do with
the measurements and how to process them
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in real time. Few production robots make use of force
measurements. Tactile, or touch sensing is now accomplished
using simple micro switches. Development is aimed at an
'artificial skin" with an imbedded array of touch sensors. In
addition to being a complex mechanical and material science
problem, software must be developed that will process tactile
input quickly and yield meaningful information that the robot
controller can take action on. The purpose of sophisticated
tactile sensors is to give the robot the capability to
determine the position, orientation and identity of work pieces
by touch alone. The Delphi forecast of robot technology being
undertaken by Smith and Wilson predicts that as many as twenty
(20%) percent of all robots sold in 1990 will be equipped with
some type of tactile sensing capability[4].
Vision is perhaps the most intriguing and complex of the robot
sensing technologies. In fact, an entire industry is springing
up in response to the need for robot vision, as well as for
vision for other industrial applications (e.g., inspection,
mensuration). The potential capabilities of vision in robotics
are:
1. recognition of work pieces
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2. determination of work piece position, orientation
3. extraction and location of salient features of work
piece
4. in process inspection and verification.
The first three applications will allow the robot system to
circumvent the need for extensive parts fixturing and
pre-orientation and, thus, move robotics closer to the concept
of truly general purpose, flexible automation. An example of
this type of application is the bin picking problem, in which
the robot must be able to pick a specific work piece out of a
jumbled bin and manipulate it into the proper orientation.
Many argue, however, that bin picking is an example of what a
robot should not do. They maintain that the parts should be
presented to the robot in a prescribed and predictable manner,
via a controlled parts feeding and fixturing system.
Ultimately, this is not a philosophical question of what robots
should/should not do, but an economic question in which the
cost of such an intelligent vision capability must be compared
to the cost of presentation/fixturing as well as considering
relative performance of the two approaches. Smith and Wilson's
Delphi forecast suggests that as many as twenty-five (25%)
percent of all robots sold in 1990 will be equipped with some
type of vision capability.[4
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Simpler applications of vision in use today include in-process
measurement and gauging of the work piece. Vision is also used
to track the weld seam for an arc welding robot. In addition
to complex vision systems, proximity and ranging devices that
make use of infrared or ultrasonic techniques can give the
robot a rudimentary vision capability.
Vision is very much a software technology - the development of
algorithms that interpret the digital picture input to the
computer. What makes the vision problem so difficult is the
ambiguity and subtle detail present in most applications, and
the tremendous amount of data that must be processed to
describe an image. The systems on the market today address
limited problems such as seam tracking or gauging rather than
the general" vision problem. Some commercial systems are
beginning to address the bin picking problem, but a reliable,
general purpose bin picking capability is a few years away from
commercialization. Hardware will continue to improve, though
it is likely that hardware will become a commodity" component
of vision systems, with software accounting for the proprietary
value added. The most promising hardware development is the
application of VLSI technology to dedicated vision processing
computers. These dedicated computers will be able to process
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a tremendous amount of data much faster than the general
purpose mini/micro computers that are now used. In addition,
the television cameras that are used in vision systems will be
miniaturized and have improved resolution with the continued
development of charge couple device (CCD) technology (versus
existing raster technology). It is felt the improved sensing
capabilities will drive the development of versatile, general
purpose robots. It is likely that sensors will be offered as
discrete modules that can be fit to appropriate applications.
The technology is sufficiently useful and promising enough
today to justify the creation of a robotic sensor industry. In
addition, there is tremendous room for incremental improvements
in the technologies and, thus, for continued growth in the
sensor industry.
2.7 Controllers
Robot controllers range in complexity from simple sequencers to
sophisticated mini computers. In all cases, though, the
controller performs three basic functions:
1. provides for man/machine interface
2. stores programmed functions in memory
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3. executes functions through control of
manipulator/actuator.
Complex controllers simply accept sensory feedback to increase
the level of control over the robot.
When discussing and categorizing robots, it is more useful to
consider the overall robot control strategy, rather than the
specific hardware that is chosen for the controller. The
choice of hardware is certainly important, but is is entirely
determined by the control strategy chosen for the robot. This
control strategy is implemented by combining a controller,
software, and the appropriate sensors and activators into a
control system.
The simplest control strategy for a robot is non servo, or open
loop control. The robot is controlled using a sequencer and
mechanical stops or stepper motors which determine the end
points of the robot's motion, but have no control of the motion
itself. Such control is appropriate in applications termed
"pick and place", where path and velocity control are not
important. Examples of such applications include machine
loading/unloading and materials transfer. The advantages of
non servo control are: relatively low cost, simplicity in
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programming and operation, reliability and high speed. The
disadvantages of non servo control lies in its inherently
limited positioning capability. These robots are taught by
programming the desired sequence of motions and physically
adjusting the end stops for each axis of movement. Even though
the sequence is programmed in software, the fact that end
points must be physically positioned limits non servo robots to
the performance of one program at a time.
The more sophisticated and flexible class of robots are servo
controlled. This means that the manipulator is instrumented
such that the controller can determine the arm's velocity and
orientation in space and, thus, can effect closed loop control
of motion. This closed loop allows close control over the
robot's path (i.e., velocity, acceleration) and eliminates the
need for physically positioned end stops. Point-to-point servo
robots function similarly to point-to-point non-servos, except
that end points are programmed rather than physically
positioned. They are also used primarily in machine tool
loading, parts handling and spot welding tasks. In addition,
because of their positioning accuracy and programmability,
servo controlled point-to-point robots are well suited to more
complex assembly and parts insertion tasks. Continuous path
servo controlled robots give the user software control of not
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only end points but of path velocity and acceleration. These
robots are used in applications such as spray painting and arc
welding in which path control is critical. Servo controlled
robots are usually taught by physically "walking" the arm
through its task or by leading it through its task with a
joystick remote controller while recording the motion in
memory. Many robots can also be programmed "off line" using a
robot programming language and even making use of computer
aided design (CAD) data bases. Thus, the advantage of servo
control is in the close control over positioning and path that
is afforded and in their programmability. Because these robots
are more complex and highly instrumented, they are generally
more expensive, less reliable and more difficult to maintain
than non-servo robots.
The most sophisticated class of robots are sensor based and
highly intelligent - such that they can adapt their
pre-programmed instructions to changes in the environment.
These are basically servo controlled robots to which vision,
tactile and/or force sensing equipment is added and for which a
more powerful control computer is used. These state-of-the-art
or so-called "second generation" robots are largely confined to
research labs - and to the imaginations of robot designers.
However, robots with rudimentary sensing capabilities are being
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used in assembly and arc welding applications. The key to
commercializing this class of robots lies in sensor development
and in control software.
Robot controllers make use of existing control hardware adapted
for robot applications. For example, the solid state
sequencers and programmable controllers used for most
point-to-point robots are standard industrial controllers. The
more sophisticated servo controlled robots use standard mini
and micro computers, such as the DEC LSI-II, Motorolla MC68000,
or IBM Series I, adapted and specially programmed for robot
control applications. The trend in controller design is
towards modularity. A truly modular controller would be able
to be interfaced with any type of robot arm and actuating
system, and would be able to support whatever sensing "modules"
were required. However, modularity to the point where
different manufacturers modules can be integrated will come
only with industry enforced product interfacing standards.
This important issue will be discussed further in Section 2.8.
As has been mentioned many times in this discussion, software
development is having and will continue to have a major impact
on the robotics industry. It is software, or as it is
popularly called, artificial intelligence," that will enable
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the use of general purpose, sensor based robots in applications
too difficult for today's robots. Software development can be
thought to be addressing two classes of problems. The first
relates to basic robot control needs such as optimization of
trajectory, increased speed, fault tolerance, error recovery,
sensor processing and multiple arm synchronization. The second
class relates to the need for high level executive programming
languages that allow the end user to program the robot for a
given application. These higher level languages make use of
sub-programs that address the basic robot control tasks, but
present the user with a simple, friendly" interface. These
programs allow the user to program in a manner more directed to
the work piece rather than the manipulator. For example,
commands such as insert component A in component B such that
holes line upw are used rather than programming specific
manipulator trajectories and sequences. Modularity and
interchangeability of software are very desirable from the
users standpoint, so that programs can be developed for a
particular robot system but used on any other system
performilng a similar task. However, the different robot
manufacturers are developing their own programming languages
and control software with little regard for interchangeability.
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2.8 Factory of the Future
The previous Sections have concentrated on the robot's
component technologies. However, the robot system can also be
considered to be a component of the automated factory of the
future" - albeit a very important component. Figure 3
graphically illustrates the general concept of Factory of the
Future - the computerized working of CAD, automated
warehousing, automated assembly manufacturing, production
control and puchasing systems via a computer communications
network. Robots are expected to be incorporated into flexible
work stations, also referred to as "machining cells or
'adaptable programmable assembly systems." These work stations
will make use of robots in conjunction with other automated
processing and materials handing equipment. By linking these
work stations with other factory computer systems, it is hoped
that the engineering and production control documentation and
scheduling process can be streamlined resulting in a much more
efficient manufacturing plant. It has been estimated that as
much as 60% to 70% of manufacturing costs relate to these
administrative manufacturing functions [38].
In addition to the component systems of the F.O.F. concept, the
development of local area networking (L.A.N.) systems will be a
driving force in factory automation. Already, companies such
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as General Electric, DEC, Texas Instruments and Hewlett-Packard
market L.A.N.'s designed for the industrial market. These
systems are similar to those offered for office automation, but
they must function in a much more hostile and failure sensitive
environment. And as in the office L.A.N. market, the
manufacturers are split into baseband versus broadband camps.
Modularity and the ability to easily interface with many types
of systems will be a critical requirement for factory
L.A.N.'s. However, it remains to be seen if L.A.N.
manufacturers can do this for factory systems, since they have
struggled with the problem in EDP environments for the last
twenty years.
The most likely starting point for this integration of
manufacturing systems is the interfacing of CAD systems with
robot controllers. This interfacing will allow for off-line
program development and will take advantage of the data bases
generated for CAD purposes. CAD and robot suppliers are
already beginning to offer systems with simple interfacing
capabilities. Smith and Wilson forecast the following trend in
CAD/robot interfacing:
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PERCENTAGE OF ROBOTS SOLD, DIRECTLY INTERFACED
WITH A CAD/CAM SYSTEM [4]
1985 1990 1995
ALL INDUSTRY 5% 15% 30%
2.9 Standards
It is clear that since robots are built up by interfacing a
number of component systems, standardization of component
interfaces or the lack thereof, will be a major factor in the
industry. However, standards are usually promulgated if there
is a dominant industry force, either powerful manufacturers,
customers, or government agencies (often customers). At this
time, work on standards is just beginning.
The Robot Institute of America is the leading robotics trade
association and is taking the lead in developing standards.
The RIA has identified eight primary areas that need standards
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and is beginning to assemble joint industry/user/academic
committees to address these areas [52]. The eight areas are:
1. safety
2. tooling interfaces
3. sensory interfaces
4. mechanical systems
5. performance specifications
6. construction
7. communications
8. programming languages
Safety and tooling interfaces, two of the least controversial
areas, have already received considerable attention and
standards in these areas are forthcoming. However, the other
areas are less technologically settled" - and manufacturers
are reluctant to restrict their options by agreeing on
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technical standards. Meaningful standards in these more
dynamic areas are unlikely in the next decade. Smith and
Wilson forecast that neither software standards nor a common
programming language will be adopted until 1990[4]. Standards
for the other hardware areas are not expected until 1985.
The strategic impact of robot standards will be discussed in
Section 4.
2.10 Robot Technology - Summary
This Section showed the diverse range of technologies that are
integrated into robotic systems. Some of the technologies,
manipulators and actuators for example, are quite mature and
incremental improvements in them are unlikely to stimulate
significant change in the industry. Control and sensory
processing software technologies are rapidly advancing and will
quite likely be the driving force in the development of highly
intelligent, adaptable robot systems. Most of the hardware
systems used in robots, including comtrols, computers, drives
and television cameras have been developed for use in other
industries but are adapted for use in robots. Grippers and
tactile sensors, however, are examples of hardware technologies
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driven by the robot industry. Figures 4 and 5 characterize the
components of a robot system along a number of dimensions
including technological content and maturity and the extent to
which a component represents a seminal robot technology
versus being an existing, adapted technology. These
characterizations are very important in understanding the
strategic choices faced by the industry. For example, which
technologies can be easily reversed, engineered and copied?
Which are likely to help the firm stake out a proprietary,
defendable position? Which technologies represent the best
track for firms looking to diversify into robots? These issues
will be examined closely in the discussion of strategy in the
robot industry.
It is clear that the technological frontier in robotics is the
development of sensor based, highly intelligent general purpose
robots. Such systems represent the most interesting research
problems, and are intriguing to engineers, managers and even
the public at large. However, there seems to be an
"anthropomorphic bias" in robot development[48]. Technologies
such as tactile and vision sensing, general purpose grippers
and artificial intelligence are being applied to give the robot
human-like sensory perception, dexterity and decision making
capability. Much of the research and development is implicitly
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and explicitly aimed at replacing general purpose human labor
in factories. Sociological and moral implications aside,
should robot development be aimed at replicating human
functions and capabilities, or towards designing automation
systems optimized for doing particular tasks? The question
really is one of economic tradeoffs between highly intelligent,
general purpose robots adapted to a particular application
(much as a human worker is) and more specialized robot systems
with less flexibility and intelligence, but tailored for a
specific application. The strategic question facing the robot
manufacturer is where in the continuum shown in Figure 6 the
company should be positioned. Seering [48] argues that the
·second generation" robot will be an embodiement of firm
automation" or more towards the center of the automation
spectrum, rather than the truly general purpose, flexible
robot. This argument is based on the premise that good
software technology that can integrate advanced sensors with
adaptive, real time decision making is quite far away. And in
the interim, the most intelligent general purpose robots that
are being marketed will not be more useful and cost effective
than well designed firm automation systems. This technological
question of the appropriate levels of general capabilities
versus custom design has important strategic implications, and
will be discussed in Section 4.
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It was also shown that since robots are actually built up from
discrete components, the modularity and interchangeability of
the components is an important technological and strategic
issue. It is especially important from the end user's
standpoint, for he would presumably prefer a robot to be
comprised of the bestw components for his application. It is
also very important from certain component manufacturers'
standpoints, i.e., gripper manufacturers, actuator
manufacturers, and controller manufacturers. These
manufacturers would like to have their components be compatible
with all types/brands of robots. The need for
modularity/interchangeability is magnified by the factory of
the future concept, in which many systems will be integrated
into a grand network. Thus, modularity is important to the end
user and certain manufacturers on a number of levels -
software, communications, grippers and sensors. However, it is
not clear that such interchangeability is the desire of all
robot manufacturers, especially those seeking out positions in
the market based on bundled, systems solutions.
It will be the development of component interfacing standards
that will accellerate or slow the trend toward component
modularity. Currently, standards are being promulgated in only
the least controversial and least dynamic technological areas,
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such as gripper/wrist mechanical interfaces. The relationship
of the technological issue of modularity to corporate strategy
will also be discussed in Section 4.
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3. Robot End Users
This Section will discuss the applications for individual
robots. A key strategic decision for robot manufacturers is
which end users to serve, for the potential profitability of a
market is very much determined by the leverage that end users
have over producers. In addition to outlining and defining the
important applications and market segments, this Section will
attempt to characterize these segments along such key strategic
dimensions as concentration, sophistication, complexity of
applications and potential growth. These characterizations
will be very important in evaluating the strategies of robot
manufacturers and the evolution of their strategies over time.
In examining the many applications that robots are used in, it
is important to consider the systems nature of robot use.
Robots are usually not stand alone devices. They are most
often integrated with other processing or materials handling
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equipment to form a manufacturing system. In the more mature
applications, the system requirements are well understood.
However, the complexity of many of the robot applications has
given rise to a need for system engineering support for most
end users. The robot manufacturer must also determine how much
system support to provide as well as which applications to
support.
3.1 Applications
Some of the more important applications of robots have already
been mentioned in the technology Section. Before discussing
these applications in more depth, it is useful to first
consider where robots fit into production technologies in a
general sense. Figure 7 illustrates a simplified spectrum of
production technologies and their important characteristics.
The three basic production technologies inlude job shop, batch,
and mass production. To date, robots have been most
successfully applied in batch processing environments. In this
type of environment, the flexible automation embodied in a
robot system is an alternative to both labor intensive manual
production and capital intensive hard automation systems. The
diversity of the product mix and lot sizes in batch production
47
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justify flexible automation techniques that are simple to
reconfigure and do not require extensive customized tooling and
engineering. In the future, as robots achieve an advanced
level of sensory and decision making capabilities, they will
find increasing use in the more highly skilled and labor
intensive small lot size environment of the job shop. In
addition, as the integration of robots into flexible assembly
systems becomes better understood, robot based automation
systems will be an alternative to custom engineered hard
automation systems in the mass production environment.
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FIGURE 8
ROBOT APPLICATONS
I. Point-to-Point Pick and Place Applications
o materials handling (i.e., palletizing, packaging)
o machine tool loading/unloading
o forging and heat treating
o foundry (die and investment casting)
o press loading/unloading
II. Assembly
o electronic component insertion
o integrated circuit assembly
o small parts assembly
III. Processing
o spot welding
o arc welding
o painting
o machining (deburring, drilling, polishing, grinding)
o inspection (measuring)
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FIGURE 9
ESTIMATED U.S. ROBOT SALES BY APPLICATION
Through 1981
Pick and place
Assembly
Spot welding
Arc welding
Painting/finishing
Other
25-30%
10%
35-40%
5-10%o
8-12%
8-10%
1990
30-35%
35-4o%
5%
15-20%
5%
7-10%
Source: Gevarter, 19.82
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Robot applications can be thought of in three basic
categories. These categories are: pick and place, assembly,
and processing. Figure 8 lists the most well known
applicaltions in these three categories. Figure 9 shows a
breakdown of current and forecasted robot sales by these
applications.
3.2 Pick and Place
The simplest of the three categories can be termed pick and
place applications. In these tasks, the robot grasps the work
piece and relocates it. Such applications include loading and
unloading machine tools, conveyor belts, and drop forges, as
well as packaging. Because of the simple motions required in
most point-to-point applications non servo as well as servo
controlled robots are used. They generally have limited
sensing capabilities, though electro optical parts presence
sensing is often used. However, vision systems are expected to
play a big role in point-to-point applications by circumventing
the need for extensive parts presentation and fixturing
equipment.
Pick and place tasks, specifically press loading/unloading,
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were the first robot applications. Today, these applications
account for anywhere between 30% to 40% of current robot sales
[20]. Their share of future robot sales is expected to
increase slightly over time, in part due to the increased
flexibility these systems will have through the use of vision
systems. The jobs that pick and place robots perform are
usually tedious and often dangerous for human workers. For
example, in the forging and casting applications, the robot
functions in a hot, smoky, dangerous environment. In many
machine loading/unloading applications, robot systems have been
found to be low cost alternatives to custom engineered hard
automation systems. Pick and place robot systems are generally
the least expensive of the three types of applications. The
average cost of such systems ranges from $75,000.00 for
materials handling to $100,000.00 for machine loading/unloading
[39]. The limited use of sensors and end effector tooling
keeps the cost of accessories down in pick and place
applications. However, these systems must be integrated with
other parts handling or processing machines. This results in
significant installation and engineering costs, especially for
machine loading/unloading tasks in which control of the robot
must be closely coordinated with control of the processing
machinery. See Figure 10 for a cost breakdown of the different
types of robot systems.
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3.3 Assembly
Assembly tasks are among the most complex and sophisticated of
the robot applications. They are fundamentally similar to pick
and place tasks in that the robot grasps the work piece and
manipulates it some way. However, the motions required to
assemble an object are generally complex, and often require
force, vision, and tactile feedback to complete a task and
verify that it was done correctly. In addition, assembly tasks
require greater accuracy and repeatability than do simple pick
and place robot systems. Because of this need for a high
degree of control, servo robots with path control are usually
used for assembly tasks.
However, there are few assembly robots as we've defined them in
actual production today. Assembly applications are said to
account for between 5% to 10% of current robot sales, although
many of these robots may be performing very simple tasks closer
to our definition of material handling [20]. Assembly is
expected to become one of the most important applications,
accounting for as much as 35% to 40% of robot sales in 1990
[20]. This growth is contingent on the technological
developments outlined in Section 2, most notably control and
sensor processing software. The complex, general purpose
assembly
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robots will be used to replace manual labor in job and batch
production environments. In mass production processes, simpler
robots will be integrated witlh programmable parts handling and
fixturing equipment to form adaptable programmable assembly
systems (APAS). The APAS as well as other types of "firm'
automation is expected to be a low cost, flexible alternative
to custom designed hard automation systems. Assembly is
expected to become the biggest application in the
electrical/electronic and light manufacturing industries, and
the second biggest application in the automotive industry.
Assembly robots are among the most expensive of the robot
systems. A typical assembly robot system costs approximately
$130,000.00 including accessories and installation [39].
Sophisticated sensing and control equipment account for as much
as 35% of the total system cost. In addition, the assembly
robot is usually part of a larger assembly system, resulting in
very high (25%) installation and engineering costs.
3.4 Processing
The third category of robot tasks includes all applications in
which the robot physically processes the fixtured work piece
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using a tool attached to the robot arm. These applications
include spray painting, welding, and machining. Most
processing applications require servo, path control. Arc
welding systems often require a vision capability in order to
track the weld seam. In processing applications such as
machining (drilling, grinding, deburring) in which the tool
physically contacts the work piece, force feedback is an
important component of control. Such applications present more
difficult control software problems than do the welding and
painting applications in which the robot arm does not
physically contact the work piece.
Processing robots account for between 50% to 60% of current
robot sales [20]. In fact, it was the application of robots to
spot welding in automobile manufacturing that really stimulated
interest in robots in the 1970's. In addition, demand for
sophisticated arc welding and machining robots is expected to
grow faster than demand for spot welding and painting robots.
Processing robots share of the market will decline as assembly
robots become more important.
Processing robots replace labor in semi to high skilled
applications. However, their real advantage lies in the
repeatability and consistency of their motion relative to human
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motion. In spot welding, for example, robots actually weld
slower than men. However, less welds need to be specified
since it can be assured that all welds will be performed with
predictable high quality. Arc welding robots can be more
productive than human welders not because they are faster, but
because the torch can be kept on continuously whereas a human
welder must stop to rest. In addition, robots can function in
hostile spray painting and finishing environments that present
severe health hazards to workers. They also offer first cost
and flexibility advantages to hard automation processing
systems.
Because of the need for complex tooling and path control,
processing robots are generally more expensive than assembly
and point-to-point robots. Costs of such systems range from
$110,000.00 for a typical spray painting systems to $160,000.00
for welding robots[39]. Tooling costs run as much as 35% of
system cost. Installation and engineering is not as costly as
in assembly or machine loading, since procesing robots
generally require less integration with other factory equipment.
3.5 User Industries
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The diverse range of applications in which robots can be used
has resulted in their adoption by a number of industries.
Figure 11 shows the percentage shares of each of the five major
robot using industries in 1979, and a projection of the
breakdown for 1985. Of these five industries, only the
automative industry is characterized by a small number of very
large firms. The other industries are comprised of a large
number of firms. Note that according to the projection, only
the automative industry will grow in relative share. It is
expected that other industries not presently using robots will
begin to do so when robots acquire more sophisticated
capabilities. Other industries that are expected to be
important include aerospace, textiles, chemicals, and
agriculture. However, of the expected 47% growth between 1979
and 1985 shipments, 70% is expected to come from the five major
industries, and 30% from new applications in other
industries[4].
3.6 End User Justification for Robots
A number of surveys have been undertaken in order to better
understand the rationales for purchasing robot systems. The
results of a Carnegie-Mellon study in 1981 are presented in
Figure 12 [1]. Reduction of direct labor costs is by far the
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greatest motivation for purchasing robot systems. The survey
results also showed that direct labor savings and the resulting
R.O.I. drive the decision to implement a typical robot. Users
have a difficult time quantifying the benefit of increased
flexibility or improved product quality.
However, this survey aggregated all robot users regardless of
application. Clearly, the potential application should have an
impact on the users' motivation for puchasing a robot. The
Delpi study examined factors affecting purchase decisions as a
function of application. These results showed that in
processing applications, reduced manufacturing's costs
resulting from material savings and better yields outweighed
direct labor savings [4]. In addition, the study forecasts
that motivation for using robots will change over time, with an
emphasis on manufacturing cost reductions other than direct
labor, and on enhanced product quality.
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4. The Robotics Industry
The previous two Sections have attempted to present a rich
picture of robot technology and applications. Having this
technological and market focus, we can better understand the
evolution of the robotics industry and the behavior of robot
manufacturers. This Section will begin with a descriptive
sketch of the robot industry's twenty-five year life,
introducing the actors and the projections for growth in the
future. Four distinct stages in the young life of the industry
will emerge, and will be discussed in detail. We will then
discuss competition and strategy in the industry as a response
to industry structure, technology, and the goals of firms
involved in the industry. The Section will conclude with a
discussion of the future of the industry.
4.1 History of the Robotics Industry
The robotics industry is generally considered to be in the
"emerging" stage of the classical industry life cycle.
However, much interesting history is lost by condensing the
industry's twenty-five year history into a single evolutionary
stage. There have been four distinct periods of industry
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history that are characterized by very different technological
and strategic phenomena. These stages are the "embryonic",
"initial diffusion", developmentalw, and explosion. They
will each be examined in the following sections.
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These four stages emerge from the history because they are
empirically distinct and different. Upon further examination,
these empirical differences reflect structural changes that
occurred in the industry. These changes have strategic
importance if they affect industry competition in a fundamental
way [12]. The discussion of the four stages will attempt to
explain the evolutionary processes at work, and the impact of
these changes on industry structure.
4.2 "Embryonic" Stage
Preceding the development of what are considered to be the
first robots in 1959, a great deal of the technological
groundwork for industrial automation was being done in the
aerospace, machine tool, and nuclear power industries. Many of
the fundamental component technologies that were outlined in
Section 2 were developed in these industries. Servo control
technology, especially as applied to hydraulic systems, was
being driven by the aerospace industry and its need for
sophisticated jet engine controls. Industrial cranes and spray
painting equipment are early examples of applications for
jointed mechanical manipulators. Manipulator technology was
being refined for the handling of radioactive materials in
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power plant and laboratory environments. These systems,
commonly called tele-operators, were really the first
application for remotely controlled (though not necessarily
programmable), very precise manipulators. Numerical controls
were being developed for machine tools through Air Force
sponsored research and development. Computer technology was
being adapted to replace conventional manual or mechanical
control of machine tools. This represented one of the first
examples of a flexible, easily reprogrammable industrial
machine. Although computer technology was not applied to robot
systems until the 70's, flexible automation was first embodied
in the development of numerically controlled machine tools.
Credit for the initial invention" of a robot system is usually
given to George Devol and Joseph Engelberger. In 1954, Devol
received a patent for his "Programmable Article Transfer
Device" - a robot with point-to-point control and an electronic
playback memory (hardwired relay logic rather than computer
memory). Engelberger managed a small Connecticut based
aerospace controls manufacturer, and together with Devol, began
experimenting with the concepts embodied in Devol's patents.
In 1958, Engelberger's aerospace operation and Devol's patents
were acquired by Consolidated Diesel Electric (now CONDEC
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Corporation), a manufacturer of military vehicles. It was at
Consolidated in 1959 that the first prototype Unimate" robot
was built, and then subsequently installed at General Motors'
Turnstead plant. At nearly the same time, in Lansing,
Michigan, the Planet Corporation developed and produced a
simple, mechanical cam controlled pick and place robot.
However, Planet, a material handling systems manufacturer, soon
dropped out of robot production, only to re-enter the market in
1980 with its Armax Robot.
The very first Unimate" was a hydraulic, servo controlled
robot with a hardwired electronic memory. It was used to load
and unload a hot die casting machine. In developing the
Unimate, Devol and Engelberger worked very closely with
engineers at GM and Ford to understand their needs and to
establish meaningful specifications for the system. The first
production Unimate was shipped to a Ford plant in 1961.
Consolidated Diesel soon realized that the robot operation
would require substantial research and development funding, far
greater than it could generate by itself. Its search for a
partner to share the burden and risk of such funding ended with
an agreement with Pullman Corporation in 1961. Unimation was
founded as a joint venture between Pullman (51%) and
Consolidated (49%) in 1962.
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The seemingly huge market for robots attracted a few other
entrants in the early 1960's. American Metal Foundries (AMF)
introduced a line of analog controlled pick and place robots.
However, they were unsuccessful and subsequently sold the
technology to Prab Conveyors in 1969. PaR Systems was started
by engineers from the machinery design group at General Mills.
Rather than addressing the metal working and automotive
industries, PaR developed a line of remotely controlled
tele-operators for the nuclear power industry. PaR Systems was
acquired by GCA Corporation in 1981.
It was in these early years that Unimation established itself
as the industry leader - and, in fact, Unimation was "the
robotics industry" throughout most of the 1960's. It also
became clear that industry was not prepared to quickly gobble
up thousands of programmable, general purpose machines.
Unimation found it necessary to customize machines and provide
a great deal of applications support. Sales in the years 1962
through 1967 ranged from ten to 50 systems per year. As the
pioneer in this emerging industry, Unimation operated at a loss
until 1975. Unwilling to continue supporting Unimation,
Pullman Corporation sold their interest in Unimation to Condec
in the early 1970's. Unimation was recently acquired from
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Condec by Westinghouse. The more recent history of Unimation
will be explored in later sections.
There are a number of important factors that characterize this
embryonic stage of industry development. The driving force
behind the creation of this industry was technological
innovation. However, the innovation was not one of an
academic, scientific nature, but rather one of an engineering,
applications oriented nature. The first robot was a synthesis
of existing component technologies into a single system.
Furthermore, it can be argued that the economically important
innovation was finding an appropriate application for this
system, rather than the development of the system itself. The
relative importance of applications engineering versus product
engineering was established early on in the industry's history,
and continues to be an important characteristic of the industry.
Because of the engineering/applications nature of the initial
innovation, the academic and theoretical work in robotics has
anteceded the industrial application of the technology. This
application of technology before the theoretical groundwork has
been laid is not unusual or unprecedented [3]. Heat engines,
telephones and light bulbs were developed before the underlying
theory was understood. However, this pattern of
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innovation is changing as our technology becomes so advanced.
Major technological breakthroughs of far reaching economic and
theoretical importance now come almost exclusively from the
research lab, be it academic, government or industrial.
The nature and role of end users also emerged during the
industry's first few years, and set a pattern that continues
today. The automotive industry, along with the allied metal
working industry quickly became the robot manufacturers'
primary customer base. These engineering intensive,
sophisticated end users had a very big influence on initial
product development and on the identification of new
applications for robots. Their sophistication and market power
allowed them to shape Unimation, and thus the robot industry,
into a responsive, 'systems engineering house." In this
respect, the robot industry can be compared to the machine tool
industry. With machine tools, users have driven innovation by
creating new needs and applications, and often by developing
and specifying products on their own [13]. This pattern of
innovation has steered the development of the machine tool
industry towards one characterized by relatively small, custom
oriented manufacturers with resulting high production and
engineering costs - and low profits [13]. The lethargic,
conservative machine tool industry might not seem to be similar
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to the more dynamic, "high tech" robot industry. However, the
pattern of innovation and dependence on end users in the early
robot industry is strikingly similar to that of the machine
tool industry.
It is also important to note the structure of the automotive
industry and its impact on robot manufacturers. The big
three" United States auto makers have traditionally wielded a
great deal of power over suppliers. They can use their size
and threat of backward integration to drive down suppliers'
prices and margins. In addition, the cyclicality of their
business presents cash flow and production problems to
suppliers dependent on auto makers. The early robot makers'
other customer base, the casting and foundry industry is much
less concentrated than the automotive industry. Thus, it has
less leverage over it. However, much of their business is
automotive, or industrial durable related, and subject to the
vagaries of the business cycle. The infant robot industry's
fate was very much tied to these cyclical and relatively
concentrated customer bases.
The concept of industrial of robots has always stirred interest
and excitement, if not controversy. The intuitive appeal of
flexible automation to the engineers'
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fancy, and the seemingly huge market for robotic devices
attracted a number of entrants to the embryonic industry.
However, the goals and motivations of these entrants were quite
varied. Unimation, AMF and Planet were horizontal entries from
related industries. Of these, AMF and Planet were basically
machinery manufacturers seeking to leverage their machine
design experience and diversify their existing business. When
it became clear that the market for robots was not about to
explode, and that it might be many years before a profit could
be made, these firms dropped out of the industry and returned
to their original lines of business. PaR Systems was an
entrepreneurial start up that chose to exploit a single market
niche. They, too, sought to apply their mechanical machine
design experience in this new marketplace. PaR survived
primarily because of their judicious choice of markets, and of
course, their ability to execute their market strategy.
Unimation's goals and motivation were quite different. At
first glance, it may appear that they sought to simply leverage
their controls and servo system expertise in a new market.
However, it is clear that Engelberger and Devol were, and still
are, "true believers' in flexible automation. They survived in
the early years through their ability to identify good
appications and to work with end users in implementing
systems. Above and beyond their abilities as engineers and
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marketers, it was Engelberger's and Devol's perserverence in
the face of over fifteen consecutive losing years that allows
it to be the market leader today. This perserverence was the
direct result of the founders' total personal commitment to the
ideology and technology embodied in robotics. Thus, rather
than simply to apply their existing expertise in a new market,
Unimation's motivation was the realization of its founders'
wBrave New World" of flexible automation. This personal and
ideological motivation has enabled the firm to survive through
four corporate parents and a decade and a half of
unprofitability.
Summary
Many of the forces that have continued to shape the robotics
industry emerged in this embryonic stage of development. The
industry's technological roots can be traced to the aerospace
and nuclear power industries as well as to the general
functional discipline of machinery design. Thus, the robot
manufacturer became an "integrator" of a set of component
technologies. The economically important innovations in this
stage of development were the identification of appropriate
applications for this technology, rather than general product
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or component innovations. Furthermore, the industrial
application of "flexible automation" preceeded any academic
research or theoretical development. The robot industry's
first cusomer base was a concentrated and powerful one - the
automobile manufacturers. However, it was also a sophisticated
and innovative one. End users initially played and continue to
play a big role in the identification of new applications and
the specification of system capabilities. The early promise of
the robot industry in part rested on this relationship with a
huge, capital intensive customer base. This promise attracted
a number of early entrants. The unprofitable and uncertain
nature of the market for robots soon drove out most of the
entrants, and left Unimation as the sole supplier of industrial
robots. Unimation's staying power can be atrributed to the
personal and ideological commitment of its founders.
4.3 Diffusion Stage
The period beginning about 1965-1966 and ending 1970-1971, can
be thought of as a diffusion stage. It was a period in which a
worldwide technological intfrastructure" began to be built.
However, it was not characterized by dynamic market activity.
Industry sales were miniscule, on the order of $1 million
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per year (20 units), and were almost totally accounted for by
Unimation[54]. The unprofitability and uncertain demand of the
earlier years continued, discouraging the entrance of any new
players into the market. Quite simply, the point-to-point,
hard wired controlled robot had limited market appeal.
Automotive and metal working firms continued to be the primary
customers, using the robots to replace manual labor in hot,
dangerous and dirty work environments. The United States robot
'population' was estimated to be only 200 in early 1970 [1].
Despite the lethargic market performance during this stage,
there were many evolutionary forces at work. Academic research
into robotics was initiated in the mid 1960's in the United
States and United Kingdom. Robotics research labs were
established at M.I.T., Stanford, Stanford Research Institute,
and the University of Edinborough. It was in these academic
environments that computer control was first applied to robotic
manipulators. By 1971, researchers had successfully
implemented mini computer based control, making use of simple
force and tactile sensory feedback. Work was beginning on
vision systems, and the development of programming languages
for real time, feedback control of manipulators. In 1970, the
first International Symposium on Industrial Robots was held,
representing the academic "coming of age" of robot technology.
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Although the impact of this research on commercially available
robots would not be felt until the early mid "1970's," the
application of computer technology to robotics held far
reaching consequences for the industry. Unimation, with its
mechanically oriented technology, was not in a position to
quickly develop commercialized computer based control systems.
The application, or "invation" of this new technology would
create a new path, or "technological track" for entrants into
the robotics industry. In fact, the first manufacturer to
commercialize a computer controlled robot was Cincinnati
Millicron. They leveraged their technologic expertise gained
in the development of computer controlled machine tools.
Millicron and the commercialization of computer controlled
robots will be discussed further in the next Section. However,
it is clear that the technological invation of computer
technology had far reaching structural and strategic impacts on
the industry. The groundwork for these changes was laid in the
research lab in the late 1960's.
The establishment of a robotics research center in the United
Kingdom represented the first international diffusion of
robotic technology. However, diffusion of an economic and
strategically important nature did not occur until 1967. As a
guest of the Japanese government, Joseph Engelberger toured
Japanese factories and was given the opportunity to preach the
robotic "gospel."
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The concept of flexible automation was enthusiastically
received. Quoting Engelberger:
·The Japanese were predisposed to robots... They
had a fascination with new technology and they were
convinced that with zero population growth and a
monolithic society that imported no labor, they'd soon
run out of workers"[27].
Although it is a bit dramatic, Engelberger's assessment is
quite valid. The Japanese had already been using pneumatic,
non servo controlled manipulators as building blocks for hard
automation systems. Consequently, the robotic technology that
Engelberger proposed was not quite as alien and mysterious to
the Japanese. Furthermore, the concern over possible labor
shortages was very real. Thus, the Japanese were indeed more
predisposed to robots than were the Americans or Europeans. In
1968, Unimation signed a licensing agreement with Kawasaki
Heavy Industries, giving Kawasaki the exclusive manufacturing
and marketing rights to the Unimate line of robots. Since
then, the implementation of robots in Japan has far outpaced
that of the United States. The reasons for this, as well as
alricher description of the Japanese robot industry will be
presented in subsequent sections.
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The diffusion of robot technology to Japan has had a number of
structural and strategic implications. A new, receptive
customer base had been identified creating an opportunity for
growth in the industry. In fact, Engelberger was forced to go
to Japan in search of growth opportunities because of the very
limited and increasingly saturated demand for robots in the
United States. Unimation's small size and limited resources
prevented it from entering the Japanese market directly. Its
choice of licensing as a means of addressing world markets set
a pattern that continues today. Firms having a technological
strength and seeking to exploit international markets look to
the licensing arrangement as a low cost, low risk means of
establishing an "instant" manufacturing and distribution
system. Licensing has become a very important strategy in the
robot industry, and will be discussed at length in Section 4.5.
In addition to simply broadening and internationalizing the
industry, the diffusion of robots to Japan has had a more far
reaching consequence. The adoption of robot technology, as
well as of statistical quality control and numerous other
Western innovations helped the Japanese establish the
manufacturing superiority that they enjoy today. In an effort
to catch up with the Japanese, American and European companies
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are now scrambling to robotize and automate their plants. As
a consequence of its early internationalization, the robot
industry is now able to take advantage of international
competitive forces in user industries as a means of stimulating
demand for robots.
The early adoption of robot technology by the Japanese has
important implications for the theories of international
trade. Traditional theory holds that due to the United State's
historical technological and industrial lead over the rest of
the world, product innovations are likely to first be developed
and take hold here, then are exported to other industrial
countries and finally to less developed countries.
Furthermore, the innovations of firms in a given country are
thought to reflect the needs and characteristics of that given
market United States firms have produced products that address
labor saving or high income needs. European and Japanese firms
produced products and innovations that address capital and
material saving needs. In addition, the Japanese are known for
"spacew saving innovations, given the crowded nature of their
country.[103] Intuition would therefore lead us to believe
that given our technological advancement and high labor costs
resulting in the need for productivity increasing innovations,
the United States should have been the ripestw market for the
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robot industry. Indeed, that the initial innovation took place
in the United States is consistent with the theory. However,
the technology caught on much quicker in Japan. This
experience underscores the weakness of traditional
international trade theory given the technological advancement
and changing markets throughout the world.
In discussing the embryonic stage of the industry's history, it
was shown that the important initial innovation was of more of
an applications nature than of product nature. Another very
important 'applications innovation" occurred in 1968. While
designing and outfitting their new Lordsform plant, General
Motors called on Unimation to develop a robotic spot welding
system. This represented the first use of a robot in a
processing application. Spot welding soon became one of the
most important robot applications, and in doing so, further
cemented the robot manufacturers' ties with the automotive
industry. The use of robots for processing a work piece
greatly expanded the market beyond the traditional pick and
place applications. In addition, it created the opportunity
for firms having processing expertise (i.e., spray painting,
welding) to become involved in the robotics industry. An
example of this was the joint development of the early spot
welding systems by Unimation and Linde Welding Systems. They
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have subsequently cooperated on the development of arc and
gantry welding systems. Note that these types of working
relationships not only allow the parties access to each other's
technologies, but also to each other's distribution channels.
The melding of processing technology with robotic technology
stimulated a number of interesting licensing arrangements and
joint ventures that will be discussed in the next few sections.
The only significant new entrant into the United States
robotics industry during this period was Prab Conveyors. A
small Michigan manufacturer of materials handling and conveying
equipment, Prab acquired the Versatran line of non servo robots
from AMF in 1969. They have since improved and expanded the
product line with non servo robots of their own design. By
concentrating on simple, reliable non servo technology, Prab
has been able to become the leader in the non servo, pick and
place niche. Prab's success is evidence of the demand for
simple robots with technology appropriate to the task at hand.
Auto Place, Inc. was a Michigan based start up that also began
offering a line of non servo, pick and place robots in 1969.
However, unlike Prab, Auto Place did not provide a high level
of customer service and support. Consequently, they did not
enjoy the same success as Prab, and were acquired by Copperweld
in 1979. The experience of Prab and Auto Place stimulated the
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entry of other firms into the non servo market in the early
1970's. These firms will be discussed in the next Section.
The segmentation of the robot market by Prab and Auto Place,
and their technological strategy in addressing that segment was
an important development in the history of the robot industry.
Summary
The diffusion' stage of development in the robot industry was
not characterized by dynamic market activity. The industry
continued to be dominated by Unimation. The most important
development was the diffusion of robot technology into the
university, and to international markets. Academic research
into robotics centered on the application of computer control
of robots. Such research was clearly beyond the capabilities
of the mechanically oriented robot manufacturers of the day.
It will become evident in the next few sections that the use of
computers vastly expanded the usefulness and applicability of
industrial robots. In addition, it created opportunities for
firms with computer control expertise to enter the market.
The diffusion of robot technology to Japan was initiated by
Unimation's licensing of Kawasaki Heavy Industries in 1968.
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Demand for industrial robots in Japan soon outpaced that in the
United States. The growth of the Japanese robot industry will
be outlined in the next Section. In addition to providing a
new market for United States robot technology (and later a
source of technology), the diffusion to Japan has had a longer
term effect on the industry. The use of robots was a key
element of their strategy for achieving manufacturing
superiority. Western countries now find themselves having to
"catch up" with Japanese manufacturing methods and are
robotizing their own factories at an ever increasing rate.
This stage also saw the development of the first processing
applications for robots. The use of robots for spot welding
broadened the market for robots, and created an opportunity for
firms with processing technology to become involved in the
robot industry. This new application was another example of
innovation by customers rather than by the robot manufacturer.
The only new entrants into the robot industry were Prab
Conveyors and Auto Place, Inc. These manufacturers both chose
to address the non servo segment of the market. Their strategy
was to compete with Unimation by offering cost effective,
simple and reliable non servo systems for appropriate pick and
place applications.
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The relatively weak demand for robots and Unimation's continued
unprofitability served to discourage entry of more firms into
the industry. In 1970, only "true believers' like Joseph
Engelberger were confident that the robot industry would prove
to be viable and profitable.
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4.4 Technological Development Stage
The 1970's saw considerable growth in demand for and sales of
industrial robots. Industry sales increased from $6 million in
1970 to $90 million in 1980, representing an approximately
tenfold real increase in sales. On a unit basis, sales
increased from 100-200 units in 1970 to approximately 1,000
units in 1980 [54]. Estimates of the United States robot
population for 1970-1981 appear in Figure 14. This growth
served to legitimize the industry and created opportunities and
incentives for a number of firms to enter the industry. The
industry did remain very concentrated, with two firms
accounting for seventy (75%) percent of sales in 1980 Unimation
continued to dominate the market, holding a forty (40%) percent
share in 1980 [17]. Figure 15 illustrates the changes in
industry sales and market share for this stage in the
industry's development. Note the trend towards decreasing
concentration as more firms entered the industry in the
1970's. It is difficult to evaluate the profitability of the
industry, since most of the players have other important
product lines. This decade saw the first profits, albeit small
ones, made in the robot industry.
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The real story of this stage is not simply industry growth or
profitability, for even at $90 million in annual sales, it was
a lilliputian' market. Driving the growth in demand was the
commercialization of research and development work initiated in
the mid-1960's and described in the previous Section. These
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ESTIMATES OF U.S. ROBOT POPULATION 1970-1981
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technological developments and the resulting strategic
implications will be discussed in this Section. In addition,
the continuing importance of processing applications, niching
strategies, and the international market will be examined.
The application of computers and microprocessors to robot
control was the most important technological and market
development of the 1970's. In 1973, Cincinnati-Milacron, then
the leading United States producer of machine tools, introduced
the first mini-computer controlled robot, the T3. Milacron
drew on its expertise gained in the development of computer
controlled machine tools. It was able to develop the
hydraulically driven, articulated T3 entirely in-house. This
servo controlled robot was designed for heavy duty pick and
place applications and for processing tasks such as spot
welding and machining. In addition, the T3 was designed for
use as a machine tool loader/unloader, and as such, can be
integrated with other Milacron machine tools to form automated
machining cells. Milacron was able to successfully leverage
its existing technological expertise in machine design and
computer control, as well as its established channels of
distribution. By 1980, it had become the number two robot
manufacturer in the United States, with $29 million in sales
and a thirty-two (32%) percent market share [17]. It used
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a strategy of product differentiation, namely the increased
flexibility afforded by the computer control and by the
articulated arm to successfully challenge Unimation in the very
same markets and applications that were Unimation's strength.
Milacron was not the only company to introduce computer
controlled systems. Ollivetti (Italy) introduced a
mini-computer controlled robot in 1974, although it has never
been marketed in the United States. ASEA, a Swedish company,
introduced a microprocessor controlled robot in 1977, and began
marketing it in the United States in 1979. The Unimation
experience in bringing a computer controlled robot to market is
an interesting example of the diffusion of technology from the
academic research lab to the marketplace. In 1974, Victor
Scheinman established Vicarm Corporation in order to
commercialize his innovative robotic technology developed as a
researcher at Stanford and M.I.T. The Vicarm robot was a
small, electrically driven, articulated arm controlled first by
a mini-computer, then later by a microprocessor. To control
the Vicarm, Scheinman adapted the programming language "AL",
which he helped to develop while at Stanford.
The Vicarm robot was designed to handle light payloads in
complex parts handling and assembly applications. The company
was established in
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Mountain View, California, far from the traditional robot
markets of the industrial mid west and north east, but right in
the heart of the booming, high tech Silicon Valley. Despite
Scheinman's advanced technology, the young company experienced
financial difficulties. At the same time, Unimation was
working closely with General Motors on the specification of a
'Programmable Universal Machine for Assembly," dubbed the
PUMA. The PUMA was to be designed for light assembly and parts
handling applications. Seeing the natural fit of Scheinman's
technology with the specifications for the PUMA, Unimation
acquired Vicarm in 1977. They subsequently won the bid for
manufacture of the PUMA and were able to adapt the Vicarm
design to the PUMA specifications. The existing Vicarm
organization in Mountain View became Unimation West - and
provided Unimation with the computer control expertise it
sorely needed to compete with Milacron. The first PUMA was
shipped to GM in 1978, and the robot has since become a
standard for light assembly and parts handling applications.
Unimation has been able to apply the microprocessor control
techniques and software developed for the PUMA to its existing
line of Unimate Robots.
Underlying the Unimation experience with the PUMA are two very
important forces. First, it became clear that sophistication
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and expertise with computer technology would be a prerequisite
for survival and growth in the robotics industry. No longer
would simple machine design expertise be enough of a
technological base for entry and success into the industry. In
fact, as early as 1970, IBM began developing in-house robotics
technology drawing primarily on its software expertise. The
commercialization of computer controlled robots not only
stimulated market demand, but also changed the rules for who
could become a robot manufacturer. Secondly, the PUMA was
another example of user based innovation. From the original
Unimate, to the spot welding application, to the specification
of the PUMA, end users (specifically General Motors) have
played a leading role in technological innovation.
Another example of diffusion from the research lab to the
market was the establishment of Machine Intelligence
Corporation (M.I.C.) in 1977. M.I.C. commercialized a vision
system based on algorithms for pattern recognition developed at
the Stanford Research Institute. M.I.C. worked with Unimation
to integrate its vision module with a PUMA robot, and such a
system was first offered in 1980. Since then, M.I.C. has
entered into a joint venture with a Japanese robot manufacturer
to supply vision
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equipped robot systems. Vision has now become another
technological track for entry into the robot industry.
This stage of the robot industry's history also saw the growing
importance of processing applications for robots, and the
resulting strategic responses. In 1972, DeVillbiss offered the
first continuous path, servo controlled robot designed for
spray painting applications. DeVillbiss was a leading supplier
of industrial spray painting equipment. A subsidiary of
Champion Spark Plugs and an important supplier to the
automobile industry, DeVillbiss was very much aware of the
robot's capabilities and acceptance among auto makers.
However, rather than developing the robot in-house, DeVillbiss
chose to license robot technology from Trallfa, a Norwegian
robot manufacturer. Since 1972, DeVillbiss has had exclusive
worldwide marketing rights (except for Scandinavia and Japan)
for Trallfa robots. In 1981, it was also given exclusive North
American manufacturing rights. Previous to 1981, DeVillbiss
acted as an original equipment manufacturer, purchasing Trallfa
robots and integrating them with their own spray painting
equipment, and marketing the system under the DeVillbiss name.
This strategy allowed DeVillbiss to enter the robotics market
with little initial investment, and enabled it to take
advantage of its existing distribution network and
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strong relationship with the automobile industry. Choosing to
work with Trallfa rather than with Unimation or one of the
other United States manufacturers was a key strategic decision
for DeVillbiss. DeVillbiss was able to offer to Trallfa, an
existing distribution network, as well as its spray painting
technology. Presumably, Trallfa would be willing to payw for
the use of DeVillbiss' marketing system in the form of lower
prices. A United States robot manufcturer would already have
existing distribution channels, and would presumably not be
willing to recompense DeVillbiss for the use of theirs. Thus,
DeVillbiss could realize better margins by importing robot
technology than by working with a United States manufacturer.
In addition, it is not clear that Unimation or Prab, the only
United States firms offering servo controlled robots, were
willing to enter into an O.E.M. arrangement with DeVillbiss.
By 1980, DeVillbiss had become the leader in the continuous
path segment of the market, realizing sales of $5 milliion and
capturing approximately 5.5 percent of the total market [17].
It has adapted its basic robot for other continuous path
applications, but focuses primarily on spray painting.
DeVillbiss was not the only company to enter the robot industry
in the early 70's" with a "niching" strategy. Following the
non servo niching strategies of Prab and Auto Place, Industrial
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Automates and Mobot entered the market in 1973 and 1974,
respectively. Industrial Automates produces an inexpensive
($12,000.00) robot designed for injection molding and parts
handling applications. However, their product is felt to be
technologically inferior to the non servo robots offered by
Prab, Auto Place, and Mobot [53]. As a result, Industrial
Automates has achieved limited market success. Mobot (formerly
Modular Machine Company) has pursued a unique product
strategy. Rather than marketing a fully specified system,
Mobot offers a line of modular manipulators and drive systems.
The customer can build up a complete robot system, having only
the necessary degrees of freedom and the most appropriate drive
system for the application. To date, Mobot systems have been
used primarily in pick and place operations. However, given
their modular design, they can be equipped with the necessary
instrumentation and control system to provide servo control,
and could be used in more complex applications. The founder of
Mobot, Lawrence Kamm, believes that most robot manufacturers
and end users are suffering from a Pygmalion' mind set, and
have unnecessarily complicated robot systems by trying to
emulate human architecture and motion 31]. Despite Mobot's
flexibility and cost advantages over competing systems, the
company achieved sales of only $800,000.00 in 1980, and has yet
to earn a profit. Due to the Company's small size it is unable
to
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provide extensive engineering support to end users. It must
rely on having customers sophisticated enough (and willing) to
invest their own engineering in integrating and specifying a
system. However, given the relatively short history of robot
technology, and the unfamiliarity of most customers with it,
Mobot has had difficulty selling the concept of user
integrated, modular robots. Perhaps when end users have
accumulated a base of experience with robot technology, they
will have the sophistication and desire to specify customized
systems built up from modular components. This pattern of
design is typical of many engineering disciplines in large
companies, especially those disciplines that are the most
technologically mature. Mobot's strategy may be a sound one,
albeit a decade ahead of its time.
From 1974 to 1979, there were no significant new entrants into
the industry. This lull in activity can certainly be blamed in
part on the recession of 1974-1975 and the generally poor
performance of the automobile industry, the robot industry's
most important customer base. In addition, the high interest
rates that characterized the latter half of the 1970's
discouraged investment in new technology.
However, 1979 and 1980 saw the entry of a number of new firms
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into the United States robot market. All of these firms market
systems that address processing applications, although their
strategies are quite different and reflect the changing nature
of the robotics industry.
Nordson Corporation is a manufacturer of industrial spray
painting, packaging and hard automation equipment. In 1979,
they introduced a spray painting robot of their own design.
Leveraging their internal spray painting and automation
expertise, as well as their established channels of
distribution, Nordson realized sales of nearly $1 million in
1980, and is now second to DeVillbiss in the spray painting
market [17]. Nordson has recently entered into an agreement
with Yaskawa of Japan to distribute Yaskawa's robots designed
for finishing applications such as sealing, caulking, and
applying adhesives. The agreement also calls for technology
sharing between the two firms. Binks, a British manufacturer
entered the United States market in 1979 with a similar
strategy. However, due to its technological inferiority
compared to the DeVillbiss and Nordson systems, as well as its
undeveloped marketing channels, Binks has met with little
success [53]. Thermwood Corpration was a manufacturer of
plastic molding machinery. In 1980, it introduced a line of
robots including two designed for injection molding and other
point-to-point
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applications. It also introduced a continuous path spray
painting robot. Thermwood is the first United States robot
manufacturer to pursue private label marketing arrangements.
It now supplies Binks with its Model Six spray painting robot
which Binks remarkets under its own name. Thermwood also has
an agreement with Cyclomatic Industries, Inc., to produce
precision arc welding robots under the Cyclomatic name.
Cyclomatic will sell and service the Thermwood built robot
worldwide. In 1982, Thermwood reached a similar agreement with
Didde Graphics Systems Corporation to produce a materials
handling robot modified for graphic arts applications. Ken
Susnjara, Thermwood's president, hopes to establish at least
10-12 of these private label marketing agreements [28].
Advanced Robotics Corporation, an Ohio based start up,
introduced a line of sophisticated welding robots in 1979. It
has also pursued the private label strategy in addition to
marketing its own line of robots. The company reached an
agreement with Metallurgical Industries, a manufacturer of
plasma wear surfacing and arc welding equipment, to produce
systems under the Metallurgical name. This unique strategy
relfects the importance of established distribution channels
and applications experience.
Automatix Inc. entered the industry in 1980. Their entry is of
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particular significance for a number of reasons. Automatix was
the first robot manufacturer to originate from a computer
systems technological base, rather than from a mechanical
machine design or processing technology base. Their founders
come primarily from Computervision Corporation, a leading
CAD/CAM manufacturer. Victor Scheinman, whose contributions at
Vicarm and Unimation were discussed previously in this Section,
was also among the founders. The company markets a line of
vision systems, welding robots and assembly robots. Its
technological strategy has been to develop superior vision,
control systems and programming languages in-house, and to
license robot arm technology from Hitachi of Japan. Automatix
has a close working relationship with Lincoln Welding Systems,
who provides arc welding equipment for its robots.
The company has positioned itself as the robotic systems
company." As such, it concentrates on just a few applications
and provides extensive applications engineering support to
customers. The turnkey system marketing approach is felt to be
necessary because of the unfamiliarity of most first time
purchasers with robot technology, and the need to establish the
fledgling company as a legitimate and reliable alternative to
the more experienced robot manufacturers [49]. This strategy
is very similar to Computervision's CAD/CAM system marketing
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strategy. In addition, because of many of the founders'
experience in the CAD/CAM industry, Automatix is very sensitive
to and well prepared to address the problem of integrating
robot systems with CAD/CAM or other factory automation
systems.
Automatix' strategy of licensing proven robot arm technology is
evidence that an efficient, competitive market for relatively
simple and mature arm technology has now developed. As the
analysis of component technologies in Section 2 illustrated,
there is now much more opportunity to stake out a proprietary
market position based on software, vision and controller
technology than on manipulator or drive technology.
The 1970's saw the rapid growth and development of the Japanese
robot industry. Estimates of the robot "population" of Japan
in 1980 ranged from 11,000 to 14,000, about three times the
estimated robot population of the United States [1],[20]. The
well developed robot industry in Japan is important not only
because it provides opportunities and threates to the United
States industry, but also because it can serve as model for
what the United States robot industry might look like when it
achieves an equivalent size.
101
Following an early boom in robot sales soon after their
introduction to Japan in 1967-1968, the demand for robots
"fizzled" much as it did in the United States after
introduction in the early 1960's. It was only after the "oil
shock" of 1972-1973 that the robot industry achieved
significant growth. The effect of the oil shock on the
Japanese industrial and economic psyche is well documented. It
reinforced the strategic goal of achieving worldwide
superiority in manufacturing a broad range of industrial and
consumer products. In addition, it stimulated investment in
productivity improving and cost reducing technologies such as
robotics. Coupled with their natural "predisposition" to robot
technology outlined in the previous Section, the oil shock
provided the impetus for the rapid adoption of robot
technology.[5] The Unimation licensee, Kawasaki Heavy
Industries, become the market leader in Japan. However, a
large number of companies soon entered the market. Many of
these were large companies that saw involvement in robotics to
be important not only because of market opportunities, but also
because of their need to develop in-house robotics expertise.
Such companies include Hitachi, Fujitsu Fanuc, Nippon Electric
and Matsushita for all of whom robotics represents a miniscule
percentage of their total sales. The industry has evolved to
where there are now over 145 Japanese firms producing or
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developing robot technology, compared to the estimated totals
of 55 United States firms and 75 European firms.[29] Industry
sales reached $314 million in 1980, although included in this
figure are many of the simpler manipulators not considered to
be robots' in the R.I.A. definition [29]. More importantly,
Kawasaki's market share has been reduced to about 6.5 percent
in 1981. Entrants into the industry have succeeded by carving
out niches - offering robots designed for specific applications
and with varying levels of technological sophistication. Many
user firms have forward integrated into the manufacture and
marketing of robot systems developed for in-house use.
Furthermore, not all of these are the high technology or heavy
industry firms mentioned above. Sailor Pen and Pentel market
robot systems they developed for in-house injection molding and
assembly applications.
The importance of the end user in identifying applications for
robot technology and actually implementing them is underscored
by the Japanese experience. United States observers of the
Japanese robot industry like to point out our technological
superiority in software and computer control technology.
However, it has been shown that applications experience and
innovation have been more economically significant than purely
technological innovation. The Japanese robot industry has
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become less unconcentrated because of entering firms' abilities
to exploit specific applications. Applications expertise has
proven to be more important than robotic product expertise
because of the relatively simple technology embodied in current
robot systems. The implications for the potential
profitability of the robot industry is clear. The low
technological barriers to entry and resulting high number of
firms will cause any excess profits to be competed away. While
the potential for growth in sales in the industry is
tremendous, it is not clear that the Japanese robot
manufacturer will be unusually profitable.
The Japanese government has played an important role in the
growth of the robotic industry. In addition to helping
articulate a general industrial strategy, the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) has promoted a great
deal of robotics research and development. In 1980, MITI
sponsored a program of tax incentives for purchases of robot
systems. In addition, it arranged for the creation of Japan
Robot Leasing Corporation, a joint venture of 24 Japanese robot
manufacturers and 10 insurance companies. The leasing company
offers subsidized, long-term robot leases to smaller firms that
would otherwise be unable to purchase robot systems. The
involvement of MITI in the robotics industry gives rise to
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United States manufacturers' anxieties about having to compete
with Japan, Inc." The competitive threat that Japanese robot
manufacturers pose to United States firms, as well as the
opportunities that the well developed market in Japan offers,
will be discussed in the next Section.
Summary
The United States robot industry grew from $6 million in 1970
to $90 million in 1980. In addition, this decade saw the
first, albeit small, profits made on the sale of industrial
robots. As important as the growth in sales were the
commercialization of several new technologies. This decade saw
the introduction of computer and microprocessor based control
systems, the articulated arm, and vision systems. The
strategic implications of these technological innovations is
that there are now many new paths for entry into this
industry. Cincinnati Milacron based its early entry on
expertise gained in the development of computer controlled
machine tools. Machine Intelligence and Automatix have used
vision and computer systems technology as a basis for entering
the industry. Seeing the growing importance of computer
technology, Unimation acquired Vicarm in 1977 and has since
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marketed the computer controlled PUMA as well as offering
computer based control systems for its Unimate line of robots.
Parallelling the diffusion of computer technology into robotics
was the growth in importance of processing applications. This
phenomenon also created a new path for entry into the robotics
industry. DeVillbiss and Nordson were manufacturers of spray
painting equipment that saw the opportunity to leverage
existing channels of distribution and technological expertise
by marketing spray painting robots.
The entry of all the firms discussed in this Section are
evidence of low barriers to entry in the robot industry. An
efficient, international market was developing for the
individual component technologies. Firms such as Automatix and
DeVillbiss could simply go overseas to license proven, mature
arm and drive technology. In addition, firms such as Thermwood
and Advanced Robotics market robot systems on a private label
basis. This provides the opportunity for processing technology
companies to offer robot systems without having to develop
robot manipulators of their own. The lack of mechanical
manipulator design expertise is simply no longer a barrier to
entry in the industry. The ability of foreign and domestic
robot producers to align themselves with processing technology
1 6
companies effectively eliminates the lack of established
channels of distribution as a barrier to entry. In addition,
it provides robot manufacturers with "instant" applications
experience. Such experience has been shown to be as important,
if not more important, than experience with the robot
technology itself.
The effect of these low barriers to entry will presumably be
the entry of a large number of firms. We might also expect to
see normal, rather than excess profitability. Indeed, the
Japanese experience confirms this expectation. The rapid
growth in the industry attracted many entrants. The relatively
low technological and marketing barriers to entry have enabled
the new entrants to reduce Kawasaki Heavy Industries leading
market share to about 6.5 percent.
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4.5 Explosion Stage
The last few years (c. 1980 - present) can be characterized as
a stage of industry explosion.' Sales of United States robot
manufacturers increased from $90 million in 1980 to over $180
million in 1982, with predictions of between $225 million and
$275 million for 1983, depending on the strength of the
economic recovery [19],[32]. Figure 16 illustrates two
forecasts of robot industry sales. Partly as a result of this
growth, and certainly in part a stimulus for it, was the
tremendous mass media, academic and investment interest in the
robot industry. Industrial robots, dubbed the steel collar"
work force, are now looked upon as a key element in reviving
the United States' industrial competitiveness.
In addition to growth in industry demand, the past few years
have seen the entry of upwards of 50 firms involved in some
aspect of the robot industry. Looking at a chronology of entry
into the industry (see Figure 17), it appears that some
"threshold" was reached in 1980-1981, opening the floodgates
for a large number of new firms. The entry of a diverse array
of firms has resulted in a very rich spectrum of strategies.
In addition, it has resulted in decreasing concentration. The
four firm concentration ratio (CR4) decreased from .88 in 1980
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to .67 in 1982, and can be expected to decrease to further,
because of the low barriers to entry and mobility in the
industry.
The recent entrants to the industry include venture capitalized
start ups as well as established multi-national corporations
from a number of technological tracks. Their motivations and
strategies for entering the industry are as diverse as their
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FIGURE 17
CHRONOLOGY OF ENTRANCE INTO THE ROBOT INDUSTRY
Year Firm
1959 Condec Corp.
Planet Corp.
1962 Unimation
A.M.F.
PaR Systems
1969 Prab Conveyors, Inc.
Auto-Place
1972 Devillbiss
1973 Industrial Automates
1974 Cincinnati Milacron
Mobot
1979 ASEA
Binks
Nordson
Advanced Robotics Corp.
1980 Thermwood
Automatix
1982 General Electric
Westinghouse
I.B.M.
Bendix
General Motors-Fanuc
G.C.A
Graco
Cybotech
Admiral Products
Control Automation
U.S. Robots
1983 Textron
United Technologies
Nova Robotics
Intelledex
Machine Intelligence
Lloyd Tool and Mfg.
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Market Share: U.S.-Based Robot Vendors*
(1980 - 1983)
1980 .1981 1982
Unimation
Cincinnati Milacron
DeVilbiss
Asea Inc.
Prab Robots Inc.
Cybotech
Copperweld Robotics
Automatix
Advanced Robotics Corp.
Nordson
Thermwood
Bendix
GCA Industrial Systems
IBM
GE
Westinghouse
U.S. Robots
Graco
Mobot
GM/Fanuc
American Robot
Textron
Nova Robotics
Control Automation
Machine Intelligence
Intelledex
Other
44.4%
32.2%
5.5%
2.8%
6.1%
3.3%
0.4%
1.9%
0.8%
emr
. I 
0.9%
1.7%
100.0%
43.8%
32.2%
4.2%
5.8%
5.3%
2.3%
1.9%
0.5%
1.6%
0.6%
0.4%
1.3%
100.OX
FIGURE 17a
Source: Conigliaro, 1982
1983
32.1%
21 0%
7.4%
6.7%
4.2%
4.9%
2.3%
4.2%
3.5%
2.5%
1.6%
1.4%
1.0%
0.7%
0.9%
0.4%
0.6%
0.6%
0.8%
1.5%
0.1%
1.5%
o100.o0%
22.8%
16.2%
6.7%
7.2%
4.2%
4.2%
1.8%
7.6%
3.2%
2.5%
1.4%
2.3%
2.9%
3.0%
1.1%
1.5%
1.5%
1.1%
0.8%
3.0%
0.6%
0.3%
0.3%
0.3%
1.1%
0.6%
1.7%
100.0%
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I
am
individual corporate histories and personalities. Upon first
examination, it seems that the entry of so many firms in such a
short period can be explained as a rational, economic response
to the industry's recent growth and the optomistic forecasts
for future growth. In addition, the 20 years of experience
accumulated by the pioneers in the industry served to reduce
the uncertainty surrounding the demand and technology, thus,
justifying the entry of the larger and more risk averse
companies. However, we must also be cognizant of less purely
rational, political motivations. Remember that Unimation's
persistence can be explained as much by the ideology and
personal commitment of its founders as by their purely
rational, economic motivation.
1982 and 1983 saw the entry of several very large firms
including IBM, General Motors, General Electric, Westinghouse,
Bendiz, United Technologies, and Textron. Their motivation for
entry can, in part, be attributed to the desire to leverage
existing marketing channels, technological expertise, and
product lines. The diversity of these firms' technological
tracks underscores the diverse nature of the robotic component
technologies, and the wide range of opportunities that this
diversity creates. Figure 18 lists the technological
backgrounds of most of these horizontal entrants as well as of
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the more noteworthy start ups. For many of the larger
entrants, the robot industry is yet another battleground on
which to combat historical competitors. General Electric and
Westinghouse have long competed in industrial and consumer
markets, and the robot industry represents a logical extension
of their historical competition. Similarly, Textron and Bendix
have long competed with each other (and Cincinnati Milacron) in
the machine tool industry, and now face each other in the
robotics industry. Therefore, participation in the robot
market can be thought of as part of these firms' overall
corporate strategies for competing with historical adversaries
in an effort to prevent competitors from gaining a strategic
advantage. Quite simply, firms see competitors entering an
industry, and then feel it necessary to enter so as to not
"miss the boat." Such an explanation is appealing because it
helps explain the coincidental timing of the entry of so many
firms.
In Section 2, the concept of "factory of the future" (F.O.F.)
was explained. Participation in the robot market can be though
of as one element of these larger firms' strategies for
involvement in the broadly defined F.O.F. market. In recent
years, General Electric has acquired Calma, a CAD/CAM company,
and Intersil, a manufacturer of networking and communications
equipment. Robots are another piece of the F.O.F. puzzle for
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General Electric, rather than simply an effort to address a
specific and growing market. Similarly, IBM has participated
in CAD/CAM and communications markets. It must see its
participation in the robot as not only a means to sell control
computers and robot arms, but also to establish an early
presence in the F.O.F. market [50]. Having been beaten to the
mini computer market by DEC and to the office automation market
by Wang, IBM is taking swift action so as to not be left out of
the factory automation market. The other large firms that
entered the industry in 1982-1983 also clearly have designs on
the broadly defined factory of the future, rather than just the
robot market.
Another important motivation for these large, diversified
manufacturing firms to enter the robot industry is their desire
to gain in-house experience with robotic technology as well as
to leverage their existing robotics applications experience.
Firms such as IBM, General Motors, Bendix and General Electric
have almost as much (if not more) to gain by robotizing and
automating their own operations as they do in marketing robots
to other companies. The experience of Japanese manufacturing
companies that use robots diversifying into producing robots
reiterates the importance of applications expertise to success
in the robot market. Participation in an external robot market
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affords these firms an opportunity to commercialize technology
developed for internal needs. Furthermore, their applications
experience with the technology places them at an advantage
relative to firms that only produce and market robot technology.
In addition to the numerous large and medium sized companies
that have diversified into robotics, a number of start-up firms
have entered the market. For the most part, their motivation
has been to take advantage of existing manufacturers'
unfamiliarity with, and inability to adopt, state of the art
computer control and vision technology. These firms generally
address the more complex applications, ones that the more
mechanically oriented producers have been slow to pursue.
However, in addition to the entrepreneurial motivation to
exploit opportunities that existing producers cannot or do not
address, the ready availability of venture capital and general
investment interest in the robotics industry has stimulated the
formation of robotic start ups. For most of the existing robot
manufacturers, as well as for all the larger recent entrants,
robot sales represent a small fraction of their total corporate
business. The opportunity for investors to capitalize on
growth in the robot industry is diluted by these firms'
business diversification. Thus, there has been tremendous
interest in the robotics pure play" - the opportunity to
invest in a robot
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company unburdened by other lines of business. Prab Robots
(formerly Prab Conveyors) went public in 1981 and was rewarded
with a P/E multiple of 36.5, based on 1982 earnings [24].
Automatix, Inc. went public in early 1983. It was able to
issue 1,150,000 shares at $19.00 per share, netting the company
over $20 million. At the time of the issue, Automatix had not
yet recorded a profit, and does not expect one until late 1983
[49]. Such tremendous investment interest has undoubtedly
stimulated the formation of start up companies. One might
expect such strong stock market appeal to also attract
"marginal' types looking to get rich quick." Indeed, there
have been a few start ups whose products have been designed
more for stock market appeal rather than to address real market
needs.
Nearly all of the recent entries, including start-ups and large
corporations have made use of some form of interfirm
relationship. Relationships range from marketing and
manufacturing licensing agreements, to shared equity joint
ventures, to outright acquisitions and mergers. Figure 19
enumerates the more important interfirm relationships that have
been struck in recent years. The spate of these relationships
is indicative of the diversity of component technologies, and
of the international nature of the industry. The motivation to
pursue such relationships based on the fact that they allow the
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PIGURE 19
INTERFIRM RELATIONSHIPS
LICENSING AGREEMENTS
Licensee
Kawasaki Heavy Ind.(Japan)
FN Eurobotics(Belgium)
Can-Eng Mfg.(Canada)
Murata Machinery(Japan)
Binks(U.K.)
Cyclomatic Ind.
Didde Graphics Co.
DeVilbiss
Nordson
Admiral Equip. Co.
Bendix
Automatix
General Electric
Interrad
Graco
United Technologies
CCA 
I.B.M.
General Electric
Westinghouse
Lloyd Tool and Mfg.
JOINT VENTURES
J.V.
Unimation
GMF Robotics, Inc.
Cybotech
Int'l Machine Intell.
Graco Robotics
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
Subsidiary
Unimation
PaR Systems
U.S. Robots
Copperweld Robotics
(formerly Auto-Place)
Unimation
Prab
Thermwood
. 8 
·
Trallfa(Norway)
Taskawa(Japan)
Hitachi(Japan)
Molaug(Norway)
* imak(W. Germany)
Dainichi Kiko(Japan)
Sankyo Seiki(Japan)
DEA(Italy)
Volkswagen(W. Germany)
Ollivetti(Italy)
Xisubishi Elect ric(Japan)
Komatsu(Japan)
Jobs Robots(Italy)
Parents
Condec, Pullman Corp.
General Motors, Fujitsu Fanuc
Renault, Randsburg Industries
Machine Intelligence, Yaskawa
Graco Inc., Edon Finishing
Parent
Westinghouse
GCA
Square D Corp.
Copperweld Corp.
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participants to realize technological and/or marketing
synergies, and reduce the lead time required to introduce a
product.[15] The form of the relationship (i.e., licensing or
merger) depends on such elements as transactions costs,
efficiency gains, and naturally, the longer term strategies of
the participants [15].
Licensing agreements have been the most common form of
interfirm activity. Much as DeVillbiss licensed continuous
path robot technology from Trallfa of Norway, General Electric,
IBM, Westinghouse, United Technologies, and a number of other
large companies have licensed robot arm technology from
Japanese and European robot manufacturers. The licensing
arrangements were, in effect, surrogates for internal research
and development. They allowed these firms to come to market
quickly with proven robot technology, while they develop their
own technology in-house.
The motivation to pursue foreign technology rather than United
States technology was explained previously for the
DeVillbiss/Trallfa agreement. Quite simply, foreign
manufacturers are willing to recompense their United States
licensees for "instantw access to United States markets, while
a United States robot manufacturer would presumably find much
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less value added in the relationship. In addition, some of the
more advanced Japanese and European manipulator designs are
felt to be just as good, if not better, than those of United
States robot manufacturers. Refering back to the disucssion of
component technologies, it was shown that robot arm technology
is among the most mature, and most easily reverse-engineered of
the component technologies. It is not clear that internal
research and development will at this point enable a firm to
produce a signficantly improved robot arm. This technological
maturity and efficient international markets have made
licensing arrangements a viable option for United States firms
seeking to enter the market. In addition to acting as
licensees, a few United States firms are licensors of robot
technology. Unimation and Prab both have Japanese and European
marketing and manufacturing licensees. Other United States
firms seeking to export robot technology operate through
independent distributors.
The shared equity joint venture is a far more structured and
long-term interfirm relationship. Two of the more notable
joint ventures have involved automobile manufacturers. GMF
Robotics Corporation was formed in June, 1981, as a joint
venture between General Motors and Fujitsu Fanuc, a leading
Japanese machine tool and robot manufacturer. General Motors
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brings a tremendous amount of applications experience and
internally developed technology to the venture, as well as a
large internal (though not captive) market. Fanuc, which had
previously sold its robots through a United States licensee,
General Numeric, brings a line of proven robot arms and
controllers, in addition to its existing machine tool channels
of distribution. Cybotech was another venture involving an
automobile manufacturer. It was established in 1980 as a joint
venture between Renault and Ransburg Corporation, a
manufacturer of electrostatic spray painting equipment used
primarily in the automobile industry. Similar to General
Motors, Renault brought a great deal of applications
experience, as well as a line of sophisticated robot systems to
the venture. Ransburg, in addition to its spray painting
technology, brings a knowledge of the United States market and
existing industrial channels of distribution. The motivation
for General Motors and Renault to seek such a structured
relationship is clear. Neither company has signficant
experience in selling expensive, complex systems to industrial
customers. The joint venture affords them the opportunity to
commercialize internally developed technology without
distracting their efforts in their traditional automotive
product lines. Another important joint venture was formed by
Machine Intelligence Corporation, a supplier of vision systems,
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and Yaskawa Electric Manufacturing Co., a Japanese heavy
equipment and robot producer. International Machine
Intelligence Corporation and Japan Machine Intelligence
Corporation were founded in the United States and Japan,
respectively. These spinoffs will provide sophisticated vision
equipped robot systems by drawing on the technological
expertise of the two parents. Japan Machine Intelligence will
market the full line of Yaskawa robots, the M.I.C. vision
system, as well as integrated robot/vision systems.
International Machine Intelligence will market only integrated
systems, so as to not compete with Yaskawa's other United
States licensees. The synergy between these two technologies
will place the joint ventures at an advantage to robot firms
trying to develop or license vision technology, and vice
versa. In addition, by bundling" their vision system with a
robot, M.I. is trying to protect its vision system from
becoming a simple, commodity-like module. The joint venture is
therefore an attempt by M.I. to increase its own market power.
However, it does place M.I. in the position of competing
directly with its robot producing customers.
The third important mode of interfirm relationship is the
outright acquisition or merger. The most noteworthy of these
was the recent acquisition of market leader Unimation by
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Westinghouse. Unimation's previous owner, Condec Corporation,
had been experiencing financial problems, ending its fiscal
year 1982 with a loss of $16.5 million, or $4.17 per share
[24]. In addition, its highly leveraged balance sheet and
expectations for another losing year in 1983 created a need for
an infusion of cash. At the same time, Unimation's needs for
research and development funding are increasing as it must keep
pace with the advanced technology of its many new competitors.
Westinghouse entered the robot market in 1982 with a line of
robots licensed from Komatsu and Mitsubishi of Japan, and
Ollivetti of Italy. In the continuing struggle between
Westinghouse and General Electric, both firms have been looking
for a competitive edge, and it is known that both firms were
negotiating with Condec [18].
Westinghouse finally did acquire Unimation from Condec in late
1982 for $107 million, of which $83 million went to Condec, and
$24 million to the general public at $21.00 per share. The
direction and success of "Westimation' is unclear, although the
purchase did solve some important problems for all three
parties. The infusion of cash to Condec will enable it to
retire debt and help it through its current difficulties.
Unimation will now have an important source of research and
development funding as well as some sorely needed top
management personnel. Westinghouse now has access to an
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existing worldwide customer base using over 5,000 robots and a
line of proven, albeit somewhat mature, robot systems. It is
expected that Westinghouse will play a much more active role
than Condec did, although Unimation will continue to
manufacture and market systems under its own name [51]. With
its designs on the "factory of the future," Westinghouse is
expected to try to assume the role of systems integrator [51].
They will be market systems consisting of Unimation equipment,
licensed equipment, and internally developed equipment. The
ultimate success of this acquisition will depend on
Westinghouse's ability to achieve a degree of control over
Unimation's financial and managerial systems, while maintaining
and stimulating its technological creativity. However, it is
clear that if the acquisition did not occur, Condec, Unimation
and Westinghouse would have much poorer chances for success.
The other acquisitions of note involved smaller robot
manufacturers. United States Robots was a small start up
manufacturer of microprocessor controlled, parts handling and
assembly robots. It was acquired in 1982 by Square D
Corporation, a manufacturer of industrial controls. PaR
Systems, one of the very earliest entries to the industry, was
acquired by GCA Corporation in 1982. GCA is a manufacturer of
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automated semiconductor processing equipment that markets a
line of robots licensed from Dainichi Kiko of Japan. PaR
Systems, with its reliance on the now stalled nuclear power
industry, found itself at somewhat of a crossroads. Funding
and technological support from GCA will enable it to apply its
teleoperator and manipulator technology to factory automation
systems. The motivation for the small robot producers to sell
out to larger corporate buyers is rooted a need for financial
security, i.e., corporate deep pockets," and also in the need
for managerial direction. The risk of such acquisitions is
that the inventors and entrepreneurs of the company might find
it difficult to sacrifice their autonomy to the parent
company. This desire to maintain autonomy explains the small
number of outright acquisitions and mergers relative to
licensing and joint venture agreements.
In addition to pursuing an interfirm relationship as a strategy
for entering the robot industry, a number of firms have also
endeavored to develop robot technology in-house. Textron,
Bendix and in the early 1970's, Cincinnati Milacron, all
developed their robot technology internally. IBM recently
introduced the RS-1, a sophisticated assembly robot that was
developed for in-house needs. The RS-1 joins the 7535, a less
sophisticated robot licensed from Sankyo Seiki of Japan. Both
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General Electric and Westinghouse are pursuing internal
development in addition to offering their licensed and acquired
lines of robots. An interesting example of the similarity of
their strategies and of the nature of competition between them
is their establishment of formal ties with university research
organizations. In 1979, General Electric founded the
'Renssalaer Center for Manufacturing Productivity and
Technology Transfer" at Renssalaer Polytechnic Institute. In
1980, Westinghouse founded the "Robotics Institute' at Carnegie
Mellon University. Both of these organizations are involved in
state of the art automation research, as well as applied
research geared to their funders' more immediate needs. The
establishment of such university based research arms is a
response to General Electric's and Westinghouse's relative
unsophistication in advanced computer technologies. They are
hoping that this strategy will enable them to be
technologically competitive with those firms entering from a
computer oriented technology track.
These last few pages have detailed the motivations and
strategies for entry into the robot industry by some of the
newer participants. The remainder of this Section will examine
the spectrum of competitive strategies being pursued by the
many firms in the industry. Porter's framework of three
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generic strategies - focus, differentiation and cost leadership
will be used to characterize this broad spectrum of strategies
[12].
Focus on particular applications is an important strategy,
especially for those smaller firms that have recently entered
the somewhat crowded industry. Firms that pursue such a
strategy usually have a strong base of experience in that given
application, or obtain that experience through some sort of
interfirm relationship. The growth in importance of processing
applications created market niches for firms having experience
with and an existing channel of distribution for processing
equipment. Focus on a specific application is effective not
only because customers require significant applications
support, but also because different applications require
different levels of technological sophistication. Companies
such as Prab, Mobot and Seiko of Japan focus on simple pick and
place applications by offering relatively simple non-servo
robots. Most of the newer companies such as Automatix,
International Machine Intelligence, and Intelledex focus on
complex arc welding and assembly applications by offering much
more complex, vision equipped robot systems. At the other
extreme of the strategic spectrum are firmins that attempt to
address a broad range of applications. Such companies include
Unimation, ASEA and
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Bendix. An additional dimension of focus is the level to which
a firm offers specialized machines designed for a given
application or general purpose machines adapted for different
applications. Figure 20 characterizes robot manufacturers by
the number of applications supported. Figure 21 characterizes
their product offerings as being general purpose or
specialized. A broader measure of a firm's corporate focus is
the portion of their annual sales that is robot related.
Figure 22 illustrates the spectrum of firms involved in the
industry, ranging from dedicated robot manufacturers to
diversified, multi-market companies.
Product differentiation is also a very important strategy in
the current robot industry. The most common form of product
differentiation is the degree of intelligence incorporated in
the robot control system and the sophistication of the sensors
that are used. The ability to make use of vision is an
important differentiating feature. In addition, the quality
and user friendliness of programming software, and the ability
of robot systems to link to CAD/CAM or other factory computer
systems have become important features. To a lesser degree,
the choice of arm architecture and drive technology are
differentiating features. However, the maturity of these
technologies make them relatively less important than control
or sensing
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FIGURE 20
NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS SUPPORTED
Applications
ASEA
Bendix
Unimation
Cincinnati Milacron
Copperweld
Cybotech
Thermwood
Mobot
U.S. Robots
General Electric
Automatix
DeVilBiss
American Robot Corp.
Nordson
Advanced Robotics
Intelledex
12
12
10
9
8
8
7
7
6
5
4
4
4
3
2
2
A-E, G-M
A-E, G-M
A-E, G,H,J,L,M
B-E,H-K,M
A-E,G-I,L
D-H, J-M
A,C-F,H,I
A-F,I
A,D,E,G,L,M
F,G,J,L,M
G,J,L,M
A,F,H,J
E,G,I,L
F,H,M
J,M
G,L
Key
A Die Casting
B Forging
C Investment Casting
D Machine Tool Load/Unload
E Parts Transfer
F Spray Painting
G Small Parts Assembly
H Finishing
I Injection Molding
J Welding
K Machining
L Electronics Assembly
M Inspection
Source: 1982 Robot Industry Directory
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Firm
FIGURE 21
SPECIAL PURPOSE VS. GENERAL PURPOSE
Firm A
ASEA
Bendix
Cincinnati Milacron
Copperweld
Mobot
Unimation
American Robot Corp.
Cybotech
Thermwood
Nordson
DeVilBiss
Automatix
General Electric
Advanced Robotics Corp.
Lvg. # of Applications/Model
14
11.5
9
8.3
7
5.3
4
4
3.7
3
3
2.5
2.3
1.7
Source: 1982 Robot Industry Directory
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FIGURE 22
ROBOT SALES AS PERCENT OF TOTAL SALES
Firm
Automatix
Prab Robots
Advanced Robotics
Mobot
Intelledex
Control Automation
Nova Robotics
ASEA
Cybotech1
Cincinnati Milacron
Nordson
DeVilBiss
Graco Robotics
GCA
Copperweld Robotics
Westinghouse2
Textron
GMF Robotics3
Bendix
General Electric
I.B.M.
Robot Sales/Total Sales(%)
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
16.25
9.5
4.5
3.1
1.8
.9
.9
.8
.7
*
*
*
*
* much less than 1%
1-expressed as % of Randsburg's sales
2-includes Unimation sales
3-expressed as % of G.M. sales
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GROUP 1
(100%)
GROUP 2
( 1%)
GROUP 3
(1%)
equipment as a basis for differention. Another important
aspect of technological differentiation is modularity. Most
manufacturers offer a degree of component modularity, although
Mobot is the only firm to offer truly modular systems that can
be configured by choosing the arm, drive, controller, sensors
and software appropriate for a specific application. The
concept of interchangeability of different manufacturers
components has yet to become an important product feature.
Indeed, most manufacturers offer "bundled' systems in an effort
to prevent the component technologies from becoming true
commodities.
Perhaps even more important than technological differentiation
is the degree and quality of applications support and follow-up
service that a manufacturer provides. Automatix, Westinghouse,
and General Electric are examples of firms that provide turnkey
system support. They engineer complete systems including the
robot arm, controller, end effector and any necessary parts
handling and fixturing equipment. Such support is especially
important when selling to first time users who are unfamiliar
with robot technology. System reliability as measured by
"up-time", and service as measured by response time, are also
important product features. Prab has been able to achieve
leadership in the non-servo segment of the market in part due
to its average
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98-99% "up time", and less than 24 hour service response [53].
In fact, in a survey of reasons for buying a particular brand
of robot, the quality of the service force was most often
mentioned as the most significant factor.[53]
The channels through which a manufacturer sells and supports
its systems also varies. The companies mentioned above market
systems directly, and do the applications engineering
in-house. IBM has chosen to sell robots through what it calls
"value added remarketers." Commonly referred to as systems
houses, these consulting firms provide the necessary
applications engineering. However, most systems houses are not
contractually tied to just a single robot manufacturer, and as
a result, can chose the most appropriate (or most profitable)
robot components.
Because of the relatively low production volumes in the robot
industry and the need to provide expensive applications support
and service, no manufacturer has succeeded in establishing a
significant position based primarily on cost leadership.
Pricing reflects the level of technological sophistication,
i.e., the controls and instrumentation that are included in the
system. However, robot manufacturers that produce their own
arms presumably operate at cost advantage relative to the firms
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that must purchase or license a significant component in their
system. It is likely that as production volumes increase in
response to increased demand, the larger, vertically integrated
manufacturers such as Westinghouse/Unimation, Cincinnati
Milacron, and GMF will seek positions of cost leadership based
on scale and learning effects. The nature of competition in
the industry is bound to change as the fixed costs associated
with high volume production will make the industry much more
price competitive. Figure 23 illustrates the price (not cost)
positions of the more important manufacturers.
Summary
The past few years have seen explosive growth in the robot
industry, both in industry sales and in the entry of new
firms. Industry sales have increased at an average rate of
over forty (40%) percent per year since 1980 to reach a level
of $185 million in 1982. Sales are forecasted to reach $500
million by 1985 and exceed $1 billion before 1990 [18]. This
tremendous growth potential has attracted a large number of
entrants with a range of corporate and technological
backgrounds. As a result, the industry is becoming less and
less concentrated.
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FIGURE 23
PRICE POSITIONS
Mid-range system price Manufacturer (model)
$25,000-$50,oo0
$50, 00-$100oo000
$100,000-$200,000
Unimation (Apprentice)
Prab (4200,5800),
Copperweld (all)
Thermwood (Series 3,7)
U.S. Robots (all)
Mobot (all)
Unimation (Unimate,PUMA)
Cincinnati Milacron
ASEA
Prab (FA,FB)
Automatix
Advanced Robotics (750,820)
Thermwood (Series 6)
Bendix
General Electric (P5)
Advanced Robotics (2000)
Nordson
GCA
General Electric (A12,AW7,S6)
Prab (FC)
Cybotech
Source: 1982 Robotics Industry Directory
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The motivations for entry of these firms are very diverse.
Several large companies (e.g., IBM, General Electric,
Westinghouse) have entered the robotics industry as a means of
pursuing a strategy for involvement in the broadly defined
·factory of the future" market. In addition, the robotics
industry is a new battleground for firms that have historically
competed with each other in other markets. Many small start up
firms have entered the industry. Unburdened by commitments to
traditional technologies and customer bases, these start ups
seek to exploit niches created by the application of
sophisticated vision and control systems. The entry of such
firms has been stimulated by a ready supply of venture capital
and stock market interest in the robotics pure play."
The recent entrants have pursued a number of different
strategies for entry. Interfirm relationships such as
licensing agreements, joint ventures and mergers and
acquisitions have all been used effectively. These types of
relationships allow the participants to realize technological
and marketing synergies, and reduce the lead time required to
introduce a product. Most of these arrangements have involved
the importation of proven Japanese or European robot
technology. In many cases, these relationships are serving to
tide the manufacturers over until internally developed systems
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can be introduced.
The industry is characterized by a rich spectrum of competitive
marketing strategies. Focus on specific applications is an
effective strategy because of the need for the manufacturer to
have and provide considerable applications engineering
support. In addition, there are a number of firms that offer
systems addressing a broad range of applications. Firms try to
differentiate themselves technologically and by the level of
systems engineering support they provide. Because of low
production volumes, no firm has been able to establish a
significant position based on manufacturing cost leadership.
However, as sales volume increases, vertically integrated
producers will have a significant cost advantage over firms
that license or purchase a substantial part of their system.
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4.6 Future of the Robotics Industry
Throughout its 25 year history, the robot industry has been
characterized by overly optimistic expectations for growth.
The intuitive appeal of flexible, easily reprogrammable
industrial robots has so far outstripped their actual market
appeal. However, the rapid growth of the past few years
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is evidence that the industry may, in fact, be entering a
period of sustained growth. The establishment of a solid,
theoretical technological base and the presence of many large
and traditionally conservative corporations has, in effect,
legitimized the industry. However, it is wise to view the
optimistic forecasts for industry growth with the knowledge
that historical market performance has fallen far short of
prior expectations.
The experience of the Japanese robot industry is a good
predictor of how the United States industry might evolve. We
can expect the United States robot industry to become less and
less concentrated. This is due to the relatively low barriers
to entry in the industry, and the relative importance of
applications experience versus robotic experience. Firms from
a broad range of technological tracks can enter the industry
and leverage their existing applications experience, product
lines, and marketing systems. The Japanese experience is
evidence of the advantage that nichers have relative to firms
trying to address the market at large. Thus, we can expect the
share of the eventual market leader to be no more than ten to
fifteen percent, and the four firm concentration ratio to be on
the order of thirty to forty percent. The low barriers to
entry and the strong international competition will tend to
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keep profitability at normal" levels. As sales volumes
increase, large vertically integrated manufacturers will be
able to implement cost reducing technologies and will, thus, be
at an advantage to those firms that continue to license
systems. However, the component nature of robot systems, and
the efficient international markets for them, will minimize the
economic advantages of vertical integration. There will
continue to be room for systems integrators.
Japan poses both opportunities and threats to United States
manufacturers. It will continue to be a source of technology
for firms seeking to license proven robot systems, and a
potential market for United States manufacturers. However, it
is clear that both individual Japanese firms and M.I.T.I. have
hopes of dominating world markets for robot technology, in the
manner of Japanese electronics and automobile manufacturers.
They are addressing their acknowledged weakness in computer
control hardware and software through internal research and
joint industry-government research. M.I.T.I. recently launched
a seven year, $30 million program to develop highly
intelligent, general purpose robot systems by founding a joint
research association comprised of ten major robot, computer,
and machine tool manufacturers [34]. The United States robot
industry soon may no longer be able to congratulate itself for
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its technological superiority over Japanese manufacturers.
A number of factors have prevented Japanese robot companies
from entering the United States market directly. Their
unfamiliarity with United States markets and lack of
distribution channels have created the incentive to seek ties
with United States companies. In addition, friction between
the United States and Japan over the balance of trade has
discouraged the large scale invasion of Japanese robot
companies. However, forecasts of the United States market
penetration of Japanese manufacturers in 1985 range from twenty
percent to nearly fifty percent [425]. It will be especially
interesting to see what happens when the licensing agreements
signed in the last few years begin to expire. If United States
manufacturers do not renew the agreements, choosing instead to
market internally developed systems, it is very likely that the
Japanese firms will enter the market directly. Furthermore,
the factory of the future" concept creates an opportunity for
Japanese firms. Many United States firms are already looking
to Japan to learn modern manufacturing management techniques
such as "kanban," and quality circles, in addition to learning
from their applications experience with robot systems. The
opportunity will exist for Japanese firms to export this total
package of manufacturing and management techniques on a systems
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consulting basis. Who better than a Japanese company to look
to for assistance in designing and setting up a new
manufacturing plant?
We can expect to see more interfirm research and development
and industry funded academic research as a response to the
concerted Japanese development effort. In addition to the
previously mentioned research programs at Renssalaer and
Carnegie-Mellon, industry sponsored robotics research is
proceeding at a number of other United States universitites.
The proposed establishment of a semiconductor research
institute funded by a number of leading United States computer
and semiconductor manufacturers is evidence of the awareness of
the need for interfirm cooperation on basic research. The FTC
is expected to make it easier for firms to share the costs of
basic research in response to the planned industrial research
programs of Japanese and European governments. In addition to
bolstering the industry's international competitiveness, such
interfirm technology sharing will help smaller, less well
financed robot manufacturers compete with the larger firms
(IBM, General Electric) in the industry. The net result should
be a more competitive, less concentrated albeit less profitable
industry.
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The continual learning by end users and their increased
sophistication with respect to robot technology is bound to
have an important effect on the industry. The effectiveness of
the "turnkey" system strategy relies on end users'
unfamiliarity with technology and resulting need for
engineering support. However, as the technology diffuses
through academia and industry, end users will be more able and
willing to engineer their own systems. In most machinery and
plant engineering departments of large companies, engineers
design factory machinery and utility systems by specifying the
best and most appropriate components. Outside consultants are
used on jobs that are too complex for in-house staff, or if
internal resources are stretched too thin. The result is that
many components, such as industrial controls, motors,
conveyors, etc., have become commodities ordered from
catalogs. There is no reason to believe that such a design
process will not characterize the robot industry, once enough
users become sufficiently sophisticated to specify their own
systems. The component nature of robot technology makes it
especially prone to such a future. If robot components do
become somewhat "commodity-like," the implication for strategy
is that cost leadership will become relatively more important,
and turnkey support will become less important.
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However, we can expect robot manufacturers to resist the trend
towards commodity components by "bundling" their own
components, and by making it difficult to integrate other
manufacturers' components. Just as office automation and
E.D.P. vendors have found it difficult to agree on networking
and interfacing standards, robot manufacturers will undoubtedly
resist component interchangeability. The future of such
interfacing standards, and of component interchangeability will
depend on the relative market power of customers versus
producers. By diversifying the customer base away from the
concentrated heavy manufacturing industries and towards the
less concentrated light manufacturing and electronics
industries, robot producers will be able to maintain a modicum
of leverage over customers. However, the large number of
participants and the presumably unconcentrated nature of the
robot industry will act to lessen their bargaining power with
users. I believe that market demand will create opportunities
for component suppliers, and will, thus, force the hand of
robot manufacturers to adopt interfacing standards. The timing
of these important changes is still unclear, but we might
expect end users to have enough experience with robot systems
to be able to specify components in five to ten years.
Much of the current academic research and development is aimed
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at developing robotic systems for environments other than the
factory floor. Unmanned submarines with robotic manipulators
install and maintain transoceanic cables. It is expected that
robotic technology will be applied in industries as diverse as
mining, agriculture, and space exploration. Indeed, the
unmanned Viking Explorer is one of the most sophisticated
examples of robot technology. It is doubtful that companies
that now produce manufacturing oriented robots will be able to
address these other applications directly. Similar to the
manner in which spray painting equipment manufacturers have
acquired robot technology through licensing and joint ventures,
firms manufacturing mining equipment or agricultural equipment
will likely pursue such interfirm technology transfer. The
demand for robotic component technologies in these other
industries will be added incentive for robot manufacturers to
modularize their components and make them interchangeable.
Nearly all of the trends in the industry point to decreasing
concentration and increasing competition. Such healthy
competition will undoubtedly cause marginal firms to fail, and
will prevent any single firm from earning significant
"monopolyw profits. Furthermore, many analysts predict a
"shake out" of the smaller, marginal firms in the near future,
expecially if the economic recovery is not as strong as is
hoped. The implications of this vigorous competition for users
of robot systems are very positive.
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5. Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this thesis is to describe and analyze the
evolution of the robotics industry. Of particular interest are
firms' strategic responses to evolutionary forces. These
forces include technological and marketing changes in the
immediate industry and in adjacent industries, as well as
exogenous forces such as the oil shock and trade
protectionism. The robotics industry was chosen for study
because of the impact it is expected to have on the United
States and world economies. In addition, the technological
diversity inherent in robotics and the high degree of
international activity in the industry make it particularly
interesting.
The first two Sections discussed robot technology and
applications. It was shown that robots are electromechanical
systems comprised of several distinct component technologies.
These components include the robot arm, drive system, end
effector, controller and sensors. Of these, the controller and
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sensors are the most technologically dynamic, and have had and
will continue to have the biggest impact on the industry. The
development of versatile control and sensor processing software
is felt to be the key to making robot systems more useful and
generally applicable. This diversity of component technologies
has created opportunities for a broad range of existing firms.
Furthermore, the relative technological maturity of the
components affects firms' ability to successfully enter the
robot industry based on experience with a given component
technology. A key element of the robot manufacturers
technological strategy was shown to be the degree to which a
robot is designed as a sophisticated, general purpose machine,
or as a simpler specialized system.
The technological sophistication and cost of the robot systm is
naturally a function of its application. Robots are not used
as stand alone devices, rather, they are integrated with other
processing, machining or materials handling equipment to form a
manufacturing system. The applications for robots can be
characterized as pick and place,' assembly, and processing.
Of these, "pick and place" were the simplest and earliest
applications, while assembly is the newest and most complex
application. Processing robots account for fifty to sixty
percent of current sales, pick and place' for thirty to forty
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percent and assembly for five to ten percent [20]. However,
assembly is expected to become more and more important, and
should account for thirty to forty percent of robot sales in
1990 [17].
The balance of the thesis discussed the evolution of the United
States robot industry. Although it is generally thought to be
in the emerging or early growth stage of the classical industry
life cycle model, close examination shows that the industry has
passed through four empirically distinct stages in its
twenty-five year history. The first of these was the
'embryonic' stage (c. 1959-1965), in which the initial
innovation occurred and the first robot manufacturers were
incorporated. The early manufacturers were firms experienced
in machine design and industrial controls. Unimation soon
established itself as the technological and market leader,
although total industry sales in this period were on the order
of only $5 million to $10 million per year. Important
characteristics that emerged during the embryonic stage were
the importance of applications engineering and the role of the
customer in identifying applications and specifying
requirements for robot hardware.
The next stage (c. 1965-1970) can be though of as a period of
'diffusion" of robot technology. In the mid 1960's, robotics
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research labs were established at a number of United States
universities, and work began on applying computer control to
robotic manipulators. The diffusion of robot technology from
industry to academia is contrary to the pattern of most modern
technological innovations, in which academic research usually
precedes commercialization. In 1967, robots were introduced to
Japan by A.M.F. and Unimation. Unimation soon licensed a
Japanese company to manufacture and market its Unimate robots
in Japan. For a number of reasons, the Japanese were more
receptive to the technology than were United States or European
firms, and the next decade saw the establishment of strong
Japanese robot market and industry. However, market
performance in the United States continued to be slow, forcing
two of the initial entrants out of the industry.
The 1970's was a decade of many new technological
developments. Most noteworthy was the introduction of the
first computer controlled robot by Cincinnati Milacron in
1973. Milacron, a leading machine tool manufacturer, soon
became the number two robot producer. Other companies soon
followed suit, and by the end of the decade, computer and
microprocessor control became a standard feature in robot
systems. The other important technological development was the
application of robots in processing applications such as
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welding and spray painting. DeVillbiss, a manufacturer of
spray painting equipment, entered the market by licensing
robots from a Norwegian manufacturer, and integrating them with
their own processing hardware. Their entry established a
pattern for firms seeking to enter the industry by leveraging
their existing technology and marketing channels. It also
pointed out the development of an efficient international
market for robot components. This, in effect, lowered the
technological barriers to entry for United States firms. The
robot market was further segmented by a number of firms that
began to offer simple, non servo robots appropriate for pick
and place applications. The net effect of these technological
and marketing innovations was the stimulation and growth of
demand. By 1980, the annual sales of United States based robot
manufacturers had grown to $90 million.
The last few years have seen an explosion" in the industry in
terms of demand and entry of new firms. Demand continues to
grow in excess of forty (40%) percent per year, and is expected
to result in industry sales of over $500 million by 1985, and
over $1 billion by 1990 [18]. In response to the opportunities
this growth will provide, many new firms have entered the robot
market. These firms range from huge multinationals such as
IBM, General Electric and General Motors to small venture
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capitalized start ups. Their motivations and strategies for
entry are very diverse, although some form of interfirm
relationship has characterized most of the entries. Examples
of such relationships include licensing of proven robot
technology in the mode of DeVillbiss, a joint venture between a
Japanese robot manufacturer and United States supplier of
vision systems, and the acquisition of Unimation by
Westinghouse. The spate of interfirm relationships again
reflects the integrative nature of robot technology and the
efficient worldwide market for robot components. The entry of
so many firms having different technological tracks and
different motivations has given rise to a wide spectrum of
competitive strategies.
Having documented and analyzed the technology, end users, and
firms involved in the industry, we can now answer the three
general questions posed in the introduction to this thesis.
These questions are:
1. Why did robot technology give rise to a distinct
industry?
2. What factors have caused it to evolve the way it has?
3. What might we expect the future of the industry to be?
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The concept of flexible, general purpose industrial robots was
certainly not first conceived in the late 1950's. In fact, the
word robot" was introduced to the English language in 1922, by
a Czech playwright, who used it to describe artificial beings
manufactured to replace human workers. In addition, we have
shown that the commercialization of the first robot systems in
the late 1950's was not the result of a significant
technological breakthrough, but rather, the result of
identifying an appropriate application. Unimation seized the
opportunity to become the first manufacturer of general
purpose, reprogrammable robot systems. This opportunity
presented itself because of the nature of industrial automation
at that time. Most automation systems were designed to address
very specific applications. Furthermore, such systems were
often designed and manufactured in-house, by internal
engineering states. The high development and engineering costs
and the impracticality of designing general purpose devices for
specific needs prevented user firms from developing robot
systems for internal needs. The small engineering firms that
also designed automated production equipment tended to have a
very specific industry or applications focus, usually designing
systems conceived and specified by customers. Therefore, the
existing suppliers of automated equipment, be they in-house or
independent, were so focused on specific applications and
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customers, that they had little incentive to conceive of or
market a general purpose device for a broadly defined market.
An individual company with limited applications had little
incentive to develop a flexible, easily programmable device,
when it could instead design a customized simpler, hard
automation system. In order for such development to be
practical, the producer must be able to market it to many
firms, in effect spreading the development cost across many
firms. The robot industry can thus be thought of as an
engineering staff which no single user could justify, but the
user industries as a whole can justify. It is the general
purpose nature of robot technology, and the lack of existing
firms with the incentive or resources to develop such
technology, that gave rise to a robot producing industry.
A number of important factors have influenced the evolution of
the industry. Although the creation of the robot industry was
due to the general purpose nature of the technology, it soon
became clear that applications expertise would be an important
factor. This is because the robot is not a stand along device
that is simply inserted into an existing production process.
It must be integrated with other machinery, and very often must
be equipped with customized end effectors and fixturing
equipment. In fact, it appears that applications expertise -
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knowing how to use robot technology effectively in a given
application - is relatively more complex than knowing how to
manufacture a robot. This basic fact explains the entry into
the industry of robot users and firms having expertise with
specific applications (e.g., welding, spray painting). Even
though robot arms are essentially general purpose devices, the
high applications engineering content of a robot system has
created niches and paths of entry for many firms.
Another important factor is the broad range of technologies
that are embodied in a complete robot system. THis diversity
of component technologies has created opportunities for
machinery designers, computer manufacturers, control system
manufacturers, machine tool manufacturers, etc. to enter the
industry. Furthermore, the integrative nature of the
technology has spawned a great number of interfirm
relationships. Firms have taken advantage of such strategies
to realize technological as well as marketing synergies. The
ready availability of partners for such interfirm relationships
has, in effect, lowered the barriers to entry to the robot
industry. Now a firm with a particular application or
technological expertise can become a robot producer by
licensing proven robot technology, or entering into a joint
venture with an existing robot manufacturer. The range of
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component technologies and the integrative systems nature of
robotics explains the high number and diversity of firms now
involved in the industry.
In particular, the use of computer technology to control robot
systems has "changed the game" for robot producers, and has
opened up many new applications for robot technology. Just as
microprocessors and computer technology have changed the watch
industry, the cash register industry, and the typewriter
industry, they have inexorably change the nature of the robot
industry. The application of computer technology has
stimulated demand by making robots more useful, and has changed
the technological pre-requisites' for participation in the
industry.
International trade has played an important role in the
evolution of the industry. Frustrated by United States
industry's lukewarm reception to their technology, Unimation
looked to overseas markets in an attempt to broaden its
customer base. In addition to providing Unimation with
licensing revenues and a larger customer base, this early
worldwide diffusion had important long-term effects. Proven
robot technology is now being re-imported" by United States
firms seeking to enter the market. An efficient worldwide
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market for robot components has stimulated the entry of many
new firms and has generally increased the level of competition
in the industry. However, in a broader sense, this early
international diffusion has also helped United States robot
manufacturers. The intense international competition in robot
using industries (e.g., automobiles, electronics manufacturing)
was in part, stimulated by the early Japanese adoption of
industrial robots. United States and European firms are now
rushing to robotize" their factories in an effort to regain
their international competitiveness. The early diffusion of
robot technology has had the effect of stimulating demand here
at home, albeit with a bit of a time lag.
We can expect the United States robot industry to develop in a
manner similar to that of the Japanese robot industry. Because
of the relatively low barriers to entry, and because of the
ability of nichers to effectively address specific
applications, the industry will become less and less
concentrated. International competition, most notably from
Japan, will also tend to make the United States industry more
competitive and less concentrated. Finally, the increasing
sophistication of end users will eventually result in their
desire to specify robots on a modular, component basis. In
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addition, the application of robot technology for applications
other than manufacturing will give rise to a demand for robotic
components, and the incentive to form interfirm relationships
in the mode of DeVillbiss, et. al.
Naturally, the net effect of these competitive forces will be
to drive marginal firms out of the industry, and to keep
industry profits down to "normal returns." In fact, 1982 saw
intense price competition as a result of the many new entrants,
and lower than expected demand due to the recession.
Because of the intense applications engineering nature of the
industry, and because of end users' relative unsophistication,
we can expect firms to continue to pursue the turnkey" systems
strategy. However, as shipments increase, we can expect large,
integrated robot manufacturers to be able to realize economics
of scale in production, and to pursue strategies of cost
leadership. The increased sophistication of end users and
their ability to specify their own systems will be an added
pressure for manufacturers to shift from systems strategies to
high volume production of components.
Though it is difficult to generalize based on the history of a
single industry, there are a few significant trends underlying
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the robotics industry that could well have applicability to
other industries.
The initial robot innovation was of more of an engineering
nature than of an exploratory, scientific nature. In fact, the
theoretical work in robotics followed its initial
commercialization. However, the academic research of the
1960's had a great effect on the commercially available
technology in the 1970's, and really "changed the game' for the
initial players in the industry. Unimation was "leapfrogged"
technologically by Cincinnati Milacron, and was forced to
acquire computer expertise. Firms that are first-in' to an
industry must be very cognizant of staying technologically
competitive, especially if their initial introduction preceeded
academic and theoretical research.
The spectrum of opportunities arising from the diversity of
component technologies has attracted firms with a range of
technological and marketing capabilities. Integrative
technologies create so many opportunities for entry that it is
unlikely that any single firm can achieve significant market
power. The implication for public policy is that it can
promote interfirm activity and technology sharing without the
fear of promoting monopolistic competition. The international
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diffusion of robot technology occurred very early in the
industry's history. Given the increasing equivalent levels of
technological sophistication in the industrialized countries,
such a strategy of early international diffusion can enable a
firm to leverage international competitive forces in user
industries. This appears to be especially true of productivity
and energy related technologies.
Further research in comparing the histories of different
industries would enable us to further generalize about
strategic responses to evolutionary forces. It would be
especially interesting to compare and contrast the robotics
experience with other technologically diverse, engineering
oriented industries.
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